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ABSTRACT
Drug Discovery is a race to be the first to patent a drug that meets a significant medical need in the
world. Many pharmaceutical companies are now using automation extensively to improve
consistency and aid personnel in testing the millions of potential drug candidates within their labs.
Because these machines play an important role in drug discovery, there is significant interest in
managing their maintenance. The concern is that downtime is hampering the efforts of drug
discovery.
This project has sought to reduce that downtime and manage maintenance costs by working with
the Technical Operations Group, Novartis' in-house maintenance team. The main objectives have
been to devise a better way for evaluating maintenance contracts, improve the availability of the
equipment, and instill a culture of continuous improvement in the group.
This study shows that maximizing equipment utilization should be a higher priority than reducing
downtime. The data show that the high throughput systems are only used an average of three days a
week. Reducing downtime, which is most often measured on the scale of minutes, is unlikely to
bring about the gains that would be realized by improving capacity utilization. Current metrics and
data collection procedures are ineffective for determining automation needs and performance as well
as engineer performance. A new system for data collection was implemented along with
improvement projects as an introduction to lean principles, with the primary objective being a self-
sustaining system of finding process improvements. Contracts were evaluated along four criteria:
the indispensability of the equipment under contract, the adjusted replacement cost, the level of
customization, and the age of equipment.
The end results of the internships include a metric gathering system that more closely monitors
engineer activity as opposed to equipment activity, completed improvement projects such as the
complete overhaul of the tool room including inventory management as well as an automated error
log system, and a way of evaluating contracts that will reduce costs without sacrificing performance.
Thesis Supervisor: Roy Welsch
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GLOSSARY
Assay: A qualitative or quantitative biochemical experiment that tests the efficacy or potency of a
drug candidate with a biological substance
Engineer: NIBR associate responsible for maintenance and repair of automated equipment
* Generally have engineering or other technical background
Hit: A chemical substance that shows activity on a selected biological entity (target) and is shown to
have the correct identity and acceptable purity
HTS: High Throughput Screen
* An assay that is scaled to handle multiple plates and multiple chemical and biological
substances (100, 000 -> 1,000,000)
* NIBR has three HTS systems, with HTS-3 being able to handle plates with a smaller well-
size (1,536-well plates)
LFP: Lead Finding Platform
* Division within NIBR responsible for Lead Discovery
MTBF: Mean Time Between Failure
* The average time between failures of a system
* It is the sum of the operational periods divided by the number of observed failures
* A high value is desirable
NIBR: Novartis Institutes for BioMedical Research
Plate: Industry-wide standard rectangular plastic grid containing small wells that store the chemicals
for testing or act as reaction vessels during testing
* They have an area the size of an index card
* Plates usually contain 386 or 1,536 wells
* Most automation in the lab is designed around handling these plates
QC: Quality Control
* Calibration performed at the beginning of an experiment to ensure equipment is operating as
expected
Screener: The NIBR scientist that develops the assay and then runs the integrated equipment
* Have biology background
* LFP has about 25 screeners that were associated with this study
SolAr: Solution Archive
* Automation system that stores compounds in liquid form under refrigeration
* Prepares plates by loading the wells with the compounds for use in other systems like HTS
Target: A native protein whose activity can be modified by a chemical substance resulting in a
desirable therapeutic effect
TechOps: Technical Operations Group
* Team consists of five engineers and one supervisor
* Responsible for maintenance of automated equipment within the Lead Finding Platform
INTRODUCTION
1 Case study
The basis for this research is a case study of the maintenance group within a large pharmaceutical
company, in this case Novartis. The author spent six months onsite working with the maintenance
engineers to examine current methods for handling the care of automated equipment. This research
is a result of the observations and interviews while onsite as well as a review of the most current
literature on pharmaceutical maintenance.
1.1 Company background
In 1996, Sandoz and Ciba-Geigy joined to form Novartis. Based in Basel, Switzerland, Novartis is a
global leader in innovative pharmaceuticals, generics, vaccines, and consumer health products.
Research into new pharmaceuticals at Novartis is conducted primarily through the Novartis
Institutes for BioMedical Research (NIBR). Headquartered in Cambridge, Massachusetts, with
locations worldwide, NIBR is committed to discovering innovative medicines to address unmet
patient needs.
The Lead Finding Platform (LFP) division at NIBR is a key part of the Drug Discovery process. It
contributes to the discovery of novel medicines through testing of large numbers of small molecules
against a target to find Hits, as done in high-throughput screening (HTS), and determining a
chemical's action on many different targets, as done in selectivity or safety profiling. Both screening
and profiling currently use a high degree of automation as well as numerous assay and information
technologies.
Within LFP at the Cambridge, MA site is the technical operations group, or TechOps. This group,
consisting of five engineers and one manager, is responsible for the repair and maintenance of the
automated equipment.
1.2 Statement of problem
Drug Discovery is a race to be the first to patent a drug that meets a significant medical need in the
world. Some of these drugs can bring in over $1B in revenue per year, so there is significant
competition and effort centered around getting drugs to market quickly and having them protected
by patents for as long as possible. However, taking a drug from concept to market is a long,
arduous process that involves multiple test phases and takes around 12-14 years to complete.
Patents typically last around 20 years, so the longer it takes to get the drug to market, the less time
there is to recoup drug development costs and turn a profit.
To facilitate the discovery process, many pharmaceutical companies are now using automation
extensively to improve consistency and aid personnel in testing the millions of potential drug
candidates within their labs. Because these machines play an important role in drug discovery, there
is significant interest in managing their maintenance.
At NIBR, automation is used for the preparation, processing, testing, and storage of compounds
(potential drug candidates), reagents or tools (proteins or cells). Due to the nature of the research,
these automated machines are asked to perform a different task for every screen, whether it be
performing operations in a different order or changing the operations themselves. The automated
equipment at NIBR can shut down, often due to the slightest problem. This is related to many
things including the complexity of the equipment and the variation of the experiments performed on
the equipment.
These system shut-downs have led to a reluctance of the operators, known as the "screeners" in this
study, to run the automation overnight. A survey taken of all automation screeners showed that
8 0% of those responding felt that reliability concerns have "some" to "great" effect on their
decision to run equipment overnight. The full results of the survey are given in Appendix A.
Though the equipment is perfectly capable of running unsupervised, there is no one around
overnight to respond to a shut down. This situation either requires the screener to come in to work
in the middle of the night to try and fix the issue, or allow the time-sensitive materials being tested
to go to waste. To avoid having to make that decision, screeners prefer not to run the automation
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overnight, resulting in an underutilization of capacity. If the screens were run, or capable of
running, unsupervised, the length of many screens could be cut in half savings weeks or months of
screen time.
To help reduce the downtime, NIBR has a small group of engineers known as the Technical
Operations Group, or "TechOps". TechOps is responsible to maintain and repair all of automated
equipment within the Lead Finding Platform (LFP). TechOps is able to respond to equipment
failure quickly, though only during the day, and they often find themselves "firefighting" without
getting to the root cause of the failure. In addition, some failures, such as proprietary custom
software on the more complex and integrated pieces of equipment, are beyond the capability of the
group to fix. To handle this issue, LFP has a number of maintenance contracts with the equipment
manufacturers to diagnose and repair those issues that currently can't be handled in-house by
TechOps.
The recurring equipment problems, expensive maintenance contracts, and "firefighting" culture all
indicate there could be significant waste in the system. Without appropriate metrics to gauge
performance or progress and without a good understanding of automation capacity and capability,
LFP is seeking to better understand how to improve both automation and maintenance
performance.
1.3 Purpose of study
The purpose of this study is to analyze the decisions and procedures used in the maintenance of
drug discovery automation and to make recommendations as to how to best manage the costs
thereof. This analysis will center on a case study in the form of NIBR, a drug discovery center that
uses automated equipment that is relatively common to the industry. A secondary purpose of the
study is to make some analysis of the purchase and use of the automation itself.
1.4 Summary
It should be mentioned that not all pharmaceutical research centers operate in the same way. In
fact, even among Novartis research centers there are noticeable differences. This case study is not
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meant to imply that NIBR is the norm or representative of most pharmaceutical companies. Most
companies will differ somewhat in regards to what vendors they use and the degree to which they
utilize automation. Some may use different technologies than those of NIBR. Some companies
may even use a staff dedicated solely to running the automation. However, the author considers it
reasonable to assume that there are principles discussed in this study that can be applied to a number
of other organizations, and it is up to the reader to make those analogies that will be most applicable
to his or her own situation. Chapter 2 discusses the process and problems associated with drug
discovery and its maintenance as it applies to NIBR.
2 The Pharmaceutical Research Environment
The pharmaceutical research environment is much like other life-science research environments.
Researchers in white lab coats are seemingly working independently on a variety of projects.
Surrounding these scientists is a variety of equipment, supplies, and various chemicals. NIBR may
be working on different projects or using different equipment than other pharmaceuticals, but the
basic process of drug discovery is essentially the same.
2.1 The Drug Discovery Process
The drug development process is a long one, often taking 10-14 years from concept to market.
These drugs pass through multiple phases of testing, and thousands of drug candidates are tested for
every drug that makes it to the market. The first portion of this development process is referred to
as drug discovery. From the Novartis website:
"All drug discovery efforts at the Novartis Institutes for BioMedical Research (NIBR) focus
on patients. Scientists determine which diseases will be the focus of research efforts based
on two questions: Do we have or can we gain significant understanding of the cause or
"mechanism" underlying the disease, and does this disease represent a significant unmet
medical need? If the answer to both questions is yes, then NIBR develops a research
program aimed at better understanding the disease and finding an effective therapy. Early
discovery science determines how a disease is caused at the molecular level, using our own
discoveries as well as those from collaborations with scientists at several institutions. We
look for clues in both the patients' experience of the disease and the compendium of
medical knowledge assembled over centuries, integrated with the growing knowledge of
human biology and genetics.
Target and com pound selection
Traditional pharmaceutical development relies heavily on identifying appropriate drug
"targets," such as single genes or proteins. As our knowledge of human biology has grown,
so has our understanding of what we mean by targets for drug discovery. We now
understand that a target may be entirely interacting pathways of proteins, which in turn can
be at the root of several different and seemingly unrelated diseases. As a result, NIBR
scientists concentrate their efforts on discovering and inventing compounds that can alter
the disease-causing mechanism, whether a single protein or a complex pathway of proteins,
to bring it back in line with normal function.
Target validation and compound optimization
When a suitable target and compound are identified, the targets are rigorously "validated," or
proven to be involved in the disease state, and the compounds are "optimized," altered in
ways that both increase their efficacy and minimize any potential side effects. The tools of
modem chemistry and biology merge in these stages to give us the best candidates for drugs
of the future.
Pro of-of-Co n ce pt tria I s
Following validation and optimization, it is critical to test both the compounds and the
identified mechanisms or targets in actual patients before full development. Bridging the lab
and the clinic with experts from both sides, NIBR scientists work closely with Development
to perform Proof-of-Concept (PoC) clinical trials. These trials, performed with a small
number of patients, aim to provide initial data about the efficacy and safety of the chosen
compound, and validate our understanding of the relevant mechanism." (1)
Figure 1. Drug Discovery and Development Timeline
A timeline of this process is shown in Figure 1. This study is solely involved with the target and
compound selection portion of this process, and only those operations that involve the services of
the TechOps group. The target selection and assay development process often take up to a year.
When the assay is ready, it moves on to high throughput screening. It is at this phase where most of
the larger automation equipment starts to be used, so that is where this study will focus. The basic
process involves taking the target, usually a certain type of cell or protein, and preparing it to be
exposed to hundreds of thousands of chemical samples. These samples, contained in plates, are
then tested to see if a desired reaction has taken place. Those compounds that produce the most
desirable reactions are further tested to validate the results, determine the most advantageous
concentration and potency, and check for purity and identity. Only those compounds that pass
these tests will be passed along by NIBR for further evaluation as potential early drug candidates.
2.2 Automation at NIBR
The automation under the umbrella for which TechOps is responsible to maintain consists of four
major areas: plate preparation, tool production (protein or cellular), drug discovery screening, and
toxicology screening. Tool production wasn't considered for this study. The majority of this
equipment involves moving plates around, dispensing minute volumes of liquid (usually on the scale
of micro- or nano-liters), reading plate "results", or a combination of the three. Among the other,
more specialized, equipment NIBR has includes equipment involved with incubation, stirring, and
shaking of the compounds and reagents.
It is important to point out that there are two "levels" at which automation is used at NIBR. As
technology has advanced, the screener has less and less manual involvement with the assays.
Previously, manual liquid dispensing and testing were replaced by stand-alone systems that could, for
example, measure out specified volumes of liquids into plates and stack the plates in preparation for
the next operation. The screener was still responsible to load and unload the plates, possibly in a
time-sensitive manner. This equipment, which generally has a footprint no greater than that of a
tube television, sits on a benchtop and is thus referred to as benchtop equipment. The term
"automation", however, more commonly refers to that equipment that can combine multiple
operations without user intervention. These systems essentially consist of multiple benchtop units
that interface with one another via robotic arms, conveyor belts, and specialized software. The
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automation "systems" generally take up the space of a very small room and are significantly more
expensive and difficult to maintain. Importantly, all the integrated systems have custom software
that couples all the components together to function as one. This software can represent up to 30%
of the total cost of the system and can be difficult to modify as the code is often proprietary to the
vendor.
Both benchtop equipment and automation systems accomplish the same tasks and do so by
replacing some level of human involvement, and thus both can be considered "automation". NIBR
still has significant benchtop capacity, partially to handle smaller assays and partially as a backup to
the bigger systems. One of the major differences, though, is that the larger systems are designed to
be flexible in what they accomplish. Couple this with a variety of users, and the result is a very non-
standardized process. Automation, like other technology, usually settles into what's known as the
"bathtub curve" as shown in Figure 2. This curve shows how the number of equipment failures
drops as the "bugs" are worked out during set-up, after which the equipment settles into a constant
failure rate. At the end of its service life, the equipment tends to wear out more and the failure rate
climbs back up.
Set-Up Wear-out
Period Useful Operating Life Period
Constant Failure Rate
Operating Time (t)
Figure 2. Typical Bathtub Curve
However, the "bathtub" curve more accurately represents equipment that has standardized
processes. In the world of pharmaceutical R+D, there are few standardized operations. At NIBR,
even the users of the equipment change on a weekly or monthly basis. By its very definition,
"research" implies doing things that haven't been tried before, and thus some increase in failure rate
is likely. A more typical result for R+D automation's service life may look like Figure 3. Each peak
in the "useful operating life" represents a different screen that is usually characterized by a high
initial failure rate. In this case, most of these failures aren't the result of a physical part breaking or
wearing out. These failures are any occurrence that causes the system to be unavailable. It could be
that the system "can't find" a plate, meaning either that the robotic arm wasn't programmed
correctly, the plate wasn't put in correctly by the user, the plate fell off at some point during the
process, or there is a glitch in the software that had never been worked out because the system had
never been used in such a way. Often, these failures are software-related. Perhaps just as often,
simply pushing the "restart" button will get the system operating again with no problems. But it
could very well be the case that the user could prevent the majority of these software errors. For
example, a common error according to the data is the improper start-up or shut-down of a piece of
equipment within a system. The individual impact of such an error is small, but how many times
does it have to happen to be worthy of attention? The bottom line is that there is no system in place
to ensure that the same error doesn't happen again.
Set-Up Wear-out
Period Useful Operating Life Period
Variable Failure Rate
Operating Time (t)
Figure 3. "Random" Error Performance
2.2.1 Sample Preparation in Plates
Before assays can be run, a set of plates containing the compounds has to be prepared. NIBR has
over a million compounds in its library. These compounds arrive at NIBR in bulk-solution form
from the Basel site in tubes and master plates, and then are stored in refrigerated storage for up to
three years, at which point they are replaced or replenished. These compounds comprise what
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NIBR considers to be the most likely set of compounds from which drugs can be produced. To
help with the storage and distribution of these compounds, NIBR uses an automated system
referred to as Solar, which stands for "solution archive". Solar includes the refrigerated storage
library, as well as a series of robotic arms, conveyor systems, and liquid dispensers. When a screener
has an assay ready to be screened, he or she will request either the entire library of compounds or
some subset of the library against which to test. As the numbers of compound samples is so large,
Solar is set up to "stamp" out, or replicate, copies of the library or sub-library from its master
solution plates (384 wells at a time) and dispense a few micro-liters of the solution into new
destination plates. These plates, all of a standard footprint about the size of an index card, contain
either 384 or 1,536 wells. The trend has been to use smaller and smaller quantities and thus use
plates containing more wells, but not all testing equipment is capable of handling the higher density
plates. Pictures of the Solar system are shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5.
Figure 4. Exterior of Solar automation
Figure 5. Interior of Solar automation- the refrigerated compound library
In addition to making copies of the full library, the Solar system will also pick out certain
compounds upon request from its larger volume tube store. Here, rather than arraying compound
solutions in 384-well plates, each compound solution is available as an individual tube. Picking
individual solutions is usually the case after a full screen is run and the screener wants to focus on
and further test the most promising compounds. This often involves not only selecting specific
compounds, but putting those compounds in multiple wells at different concentrations. The
selection of specific compounds is referred to as "cherry picking" and can be a very time consuming
process.
The Solar system is one of the few that will be run on a regular basis overnight, as it can take days to
create a copy of the entire library. NIBR keeps up to six full copies of the library already plated and
stored under refrigeration to be ready at any time. The group that uses this equipment is the
compound management unit, or CMU, and they tend to maintain the system on their own. That is
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to say, they don't use the services of the TechOps group as much as some other divisions. Solar has
a group dedicated specifically to its operation and thus its operators have a higher level of familiarity
with the system. In addition, Solar's processes are more standardized than many of the other
systems. However, they still use contract maintenance from the equipment vendor fairly often.
This is partially due to the fact that TechOps isn't as familiar with the system, the software is
complex and proprietary, and there is little redundant capacity to handle plate preparation if the
system goes down.
At the end of the case study, the CMU had purchased another system, known as HARP that
prepares plates through acoustic dispensing. Instead of transferring compound solution by
pipetting, the HARP holds an empty plate upside down above the compound solution, and then an
acoustic signal is sent from underneath the solution, "flicking" a small droplet of the fluid through
the air up onto the surface of the empty plate, where it is held in place by surface tension. The
advantage of this system is it can populate the plate wells a lot faster than Solar. However, at the
time of this study's end, this system was not yet functional, as even brand new components needed
to be replaced. More will be said about automation purchase decisions later in the study.
2.2.2 Drug Discovery Screening
NIBR has a number of different systems involved in drug screening. This equipment falls under the
direction of the hit discovery group, or HDG. In addition to the aforementioned benchtop
equipment, NIBR has three high throughput screening systems, known as HTS-1, HTS-2, and HTS-
3. These systems require that the screener load in their set of plates and the kinds of reagents they
would like to use, and then, with TechOps support, programs the equipment to move, process,
incubate, and read the plates.
Within each HTS system are pieces of equipment from different vendors that have to "talk" to one
another. To do this, separate software known as Polara was designed by the vendor to coordinate
the efforts of these systems. Running a screen consisting of the full library of plates can take
anywhere from one to four months on average. HTS-1 and HTS-2 are very similar systems with
similar capabilities. The HTS-3, the newest of the systems, can handle the 1,536-well plates and thus
can has the ability to process the full library of plates much faster than the other two systems.
Pictures of the HTS systems are shown in Figure 6, Figure 7, Figure 8, and Figure 9.
Figure 6. Exterior of HTS-1 (similar to HTS-2)
Figure 7. Interior of HTS-1 (similar to HTS-2)
Figure 8. Exterior of HTS-3
Figure 9. Interior of HTS-3
Of all the equipment that TechOps services, the HDG's equipment, both benchtop and fully
automated, gets the most attention. There are a few reasons for this. First of all, HDG represents
the largest group, both in terms of numbers of screeners and amount of equipment. Second, HDG
has the least standardized procedures of the three groups under consideration. Every time a screen
is run, the equipment is being asked to perform a slightly different task, be it the order of operations,
the incubation time, the reagents used, etc. Performing different tasks also leads to reprogramming
the HTS systems for every screen, which leads to additional sources of error. Finally, the HDG
equipment simply has the most problems. This is related to the fact that there are so many pieces of
equipment that perform different functions, but also to the fact that sometimes this equipment can
sit idle for weeks or months, which generally has a negative effect on the equipment. (2) Also,
unlike the other two groups, each screener only uses the equipment a few months out of the year,
making it harder for them to stay up-to-date on how to properly use the systems.
The HDG has a goal of 20 screens per year across the three HTS systems. To the author's
knowledge, this goal has not been achieved in the past. However, the HTS-3 system was only about
a year old at the time of the study. Scheduling has also been a very difficult aspect of trying to reach
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this goal. Screeners can spend a year or more developing the assay in preparation for screening.
This produces some variability in when an assay is going to be ready. Couple this with the fact that
an HTS system can only be used for one screen at a time, and HDG has a situation in which there
are more screens than HTS systems just as often as there are HTS systems sitting idle for weeks at a
time.
2.2.3 Toxicology Screening
The final group that TechOps supports is the preclinical safety profiling group, or PSP. Whereas
the HDG group was testing a target, be it a type of cell or a biochemical substance, against multiple
compounds, the PSP group tests a compound against multiple targets. Unlike HDG, the work PSP
does has a different focus and is based on early safety assessment. The tests PSP do may be the first
indication of potential toxicity of an early drug candidate. Thus, in the HDG they are hoping for
hits, but in the PSP they are hoping to have no hits. PSP is not only differentiated from HDG in
that compounds are tested on multiple targets, but the throughputs are very different. While HDG
can test a million compounds up to 20 times per year, the total number of compounds tested by PSP
could be only a few thousands per year in total. The integrated systems the PSP group uses are
consequently different from HDG's.
The main automated system within this group is known as the P-5 system. P-5 only has two or
three users and runs a fairly stable process. A picture of the P-5 system is shown in Figure 10. In
addition, this system is only used every other week. P-5 is capable of handling more work, but due
to the high costs of the target materials used, management limits the number of toxicology screens
run per year. Because of these factors, TechOps does not receive a lot of service calls on the P-5
system.
Figure 10. The P-5 system
2.3 Maintenance Costs
NIBR doesn't have a central group that manages all maintenance costs, but TechOps certainly has
the power to influence all maintenance costs associated with the equipment that they service. There
are a number of areas associated with maintenance that have costs associated with them including
the opportunity costs of maintenance. For this study, the costs have been separated into the
following categories: downtime costs, maintenance contracts, and parts and service calls, as shown
in Figure 11. Note that this does leave out the TechOps salaries as part of the cost of maintenance.
In reality, these costs would also play into management decisions about maintenance costs.
However, the author feels it is more beneficial to learn how to maximize the benefits of the
resources in place before considering adding or removing resources.
eCost of lost plates and *Meant to cover some *Costs from service calls
labor preventative maintenance not covered by contract
*Costs represent pure and issues that tech ops *Parts and equipment
waste can't fix purchased by Tech Ops
*Opportunity costs- what *Can create a dependency *How much of this is
is the worth of an hour lost on the vendor preventable?
in a 12 year process? *Some of the cost is for
value-added activities, but
how much?
Figure 11. Cost Areas for Maintenance
2.3.1 Downtime Costs
Of all the costs associated with maintenance, the costs due to downtime are the most onerous, as
they represent pure waste and even lost opportunity. These costs consist of the lost time and
material due to a machine breaking down. When an HTS or P-5 screen goes down, materials can be
ruined because the plates often contain time sensitive chemicals. That is to say, some of the
reagents used are unstable and will be ineffective after a certain period of time. For some reagents,
this instability means that downtime lasting more than 15 minutes can cause plates to have to be
thrown away. For others, it is a matter of hours. If the downtime is sufficiently long, the cost of the
reagent, the plate itself, and all time involved in preparing it have been completely wasted. In some
cases, the screen has to be put on hold for an extra day while the lost plates are being re-plated.
This time isn't sufficient enough for a different screener to use the equipment in the meantime, so
even if the HTS system was fixed in a timely manner, a day may still be lost. There is also the matter
of the time of the engineer to come and troubleshoot the issue. Granted, this is time already paid
for, but it could be used for more value-added activities.
These downtime costs do not include the parts required to fix the system or any service calls to the
vendor to come in and fix the issue. Those costs are included in another category. Theoretically,
this category should also include the opportunity costs of the downtime. As mentioned, drug
discovery is essentially a race to patent drugs. Any time lost could mean losing this race to a
competitor. However, trying to quantify these costs is a nebulous process at best. Getting a drug to
market is a process that takes longer than a decade from start to finish. In that time, how do you
put a price tag to minutes lost, or even hours? It has been suggested to take the probability that a
screen produces a marketable drug, take the revenue that drug would produce per day, and calculate
opportunity cost as the downtime in days multiplied by the revenue lost per day times the
probability of a profitable screen. However, the revenue generated from drugs can vary greatly, with
some drugs bringing in more than $1B in revenue per year. Also, to date, no drug candidate passing
through an HTS system has produced a marketable drug. To be fair, the technology isn't much
more than ten years old, so there are HTS-processed drugs in the drug pipeline which should be
coming out soon. However, this method of calculating opportunity costs wouldn't produce much
confidence in the number, and using it to justify any decisions would be suspect at best. For these
reasons, any attempt to quantify opportunity costs has been left out of this study.
2.3.2 Maintenance contracts
Maintenance contracts represent the largest portion of the total maintenance expenditure on
equipment for which TechOps is responsible as can be seen in Figure 12. For this reason, there is
significant interest in reducing this amount. In fact, NIBR spends more on these contracts than on
parts, service calls, and lost plates combined. The interesting thing about NIBR's situation is that
they have an in-house team to handle maintenance and repairs; maintenance contracts serve more as
insurance than regular service. In the year previous to this study, TechOps suggested getting rid of
about $200K worth of contracts. Looking at the data over the past year, they only spent about a
tenth of the would-be contract price maintaining that same equipment. This would imply that those
maintenance contracts weren't a "good deal" and that getting rid of them was a wise decision. That
may be the case, but simply spending less in a given year doesn't always make the best test for these
contracts. Few would argue that having health insurance was a poor choice because they didn't get
sick that year or that buying home insurance was a waste because their house didn't burn down.
There is certainly room for improvement in the way contract purchase decisions are made, but there
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are other costs associated with lowering maintenance expenditures. This is part of the reason this
study's title is about managing, rather than simply lowering, maintenance costs.
Downtime
Costs, 11.0%
Figure 12. Maintenance Cost Breakdown for NIBR in 2007 (not
including in-house labor costs)
2.3.3 Parts and service calls
The final category under consideration considers such things as parts, spares, and service calls not
under contract. This category is very much affiliated with how TechOps operates. At the beginning
of this study, there was virtually no inventory system. Occasionally, TechOps would order parts that
they already had in stock, simply because they couldn't find them. There was also an excess of
spares for some systems, while other systems had none. This state of affairs was a casualty of the
TechOps tool room. This tool room housed the parts, spares, and tools used by all engineers to
service all equipment. In a firefighting system, there isn't much time to spend in finding the best
place to store hand tools or small parts. There also isn't much time to look for them, so ordering
more is an easy way to handle the problem.
In addition to money spent on parts is the money spent on service calls to the vendors. On
occasion, there are problems with equipment that are simply beyond the capability of TechOps to
diagnose or fix. This is perfectly understandable, as some systems require special tools that are not
cost effective to keep in house, or they require specialized training that no one in the group has.
However, being able to handle more and more of these types of calls in-house not only saves
money, it indicates an increase of learning and capability within the group. This not only helps
NIBR as a whole, it increases the professional growth and marketability for the engineers, which all
will agree is a positive outcome.
2.4 Opportunity Identification
In performing this study it was apparent that there were a number of opportunities for learning and
improvement. The original study scope included three things: improving uptime of the automated
equipment, analyzing the usefulness of maintenance contracts, and applying lean concepts to the
labs. At the outset of the study, it was apparent that downtime wasn't well understood in this
context. Therefore, there was great opportunity to look at the process flow and really see where the
biggest gains could be made.
2.4.1 Metrics
Related to the issue of downtime are the metrics used to measure performance. One metric
TechOps has used is "mean time between failure".. However, it wasn't generally understood as to
what that metric meant or how it was measured. Add to that issue the fact that there isn't a reliable
data gathering system keeping track of who uses what equipment and when, and there is little
confidence in the numbers reported at the end of the year anyway. Research and development was
once considered to be an unstructured process that was impossible to manage or control, but
opinions have changed as R+D has become a key strategic issue that needs to aligned with overall
business strategy. (5) In order to improve this alignment, some sort of performance measurement
system is required, both for the drug discovery process and its maintenance.
2.4.2 Continuous Improvement
To measure the performance of the engineers themselves, the evaluation system is somewhat
subjective. It is difficult to tell at the end of the day whether or not an engineer has done a good
job. This is partially due to the firefighting atmosphere. If an engineer's sole function is to get the
equipment back up and running, but there is no standard for how that is supposed to happen, it is
very difficult to gauge performance. Also, if engineers have no time to do anything other than quick
fixes, they will never be able to improve performance or learn the root cause of their problems.
Many components fail in a very predictable manner. (2) For example, one common issue with
benchtop equipment is the incorrect dispensing of liquid. A screener will specify a certain amount,
say 5 micro-liters, and the machine will dispense some other amount (this is noticed when the
screener performs a quality check, or QC). The engineer will respond to the call by changing out the
valve that dispenses the liquid, perhaps trying to flush it out using the system once or twice to see if
performance can be restored. Sometimes, half a dozen valves will be replaced at a time. At around
$250 a valve, that can add up. However, the money spent on maintenance isn't given much thought,
especially when compared to the potential of drug revenue. That may not be a bad stance to take,
and it is a reason for "managing" maintenance costs instead of simply "lowering" them. However, it
was noticed that these valves almost always under-dispense as opposed to over-dispensing. This
implies that the valve might be clogged in some way. If an engineer could take the time to find out
why the valves get clogged, what could prevent it, or even if the valves could be refurbished
economically, it would not only save money, but it could save both the screener and the engineer
valuable time in the long run. Predictable failures based on use and those that are common due to
lack of use should be prevented as part of an annual maintenance plan. (4) Keeping track of these
trends requires more effort, but the alternative, firefighting, ends up costing more time than it saves.
2.4.3 Maintenance Contracts
Another major area of opportunity lies in the evaluation of service contracts. To provide some
insurance against equipment failures that TechOps can't fix, NIBR buys yearly maintenance and
repair contracts with the original equipment vendors. Each department within NIBR handles these
contracts for their own equipment, even though different departments occasionally have identical
equipment. Thus, there may be potential for more "group rates" when it comes to contract prices.
However, there doesn't seem to be much potential to shop around, as the equipment is so
specialized that the original vendors are the only ones who provide service contracts. Perhaps the
biggest opportunity, though, lies in the question of whether or not a given contract is even
necessary. There is potential that NIBR could efficiently cut contracts that would save them over
one hundred thousand dollars per year.
2.5 Summary
There is room for improvement in automation performance and maintenance costs within
pharmaceutical research and development. Downtime creates waste through lost time and materials
in addition to less quantifiable opportunity costs. Parts and service calls are used for problems that
perhaps could have been avoided through preventative maintenance or different operating
procedures. Finally, it's possible that maintenance contracts aren't providing value that is
commensurate with their cost, causing NIBR to overpay for services rendered. It is not clear from
the surface, though, how these problems are interrelated, or even what the root causes are. It is easy
to point fingers at substandard equipment, glitchy software, insufficient maintenance, or
inexperienced operators, but there is no methodology in place for determining performance or even
defining what it should be. Without getting to the root causes of downtime or setting performance
standards, the group can only guess at how to improve. In Chapter 3, we will discuss different tools
for measuring the performance of equipment, engineers, and contracts and how some of them were
implemented during this study.
3 Methodology and Analysis
The methodology behind this study consisted of three parallel efforts: putting in a system for
collecting appropriate metrics, using continuous improvement projects to change the operational
culture, and developing an objective method for analyzing maintenance contracts.
3.1 Data and Metrics
One of the most crucial components of establishing better maintenance practices is to have
appropriate data against which to judge performance. These data can and should be collected to
gauge the reliability of the equipment, but also should include some information about the process
of maintenance itself. Another reason for having this data is that it helps overcome the firefighting
culture. If there is no measure or standard to tell the group how they are performing, how can they
even tell if they've improved? Likewise, if management doesn't have objective criteria for showing
improvement, how can they convince the engineers that they take maintenance improvement
seriously? A lack of reliable data, or a lack of the use of the data available, not only keeps the group
in the dark when it comes to performance, but it indicates a culture that is content to maintain
business as usual.
3.1.1 Appropriate Metrics
To collect these data and use them appropriately, it is important to know exactly what data are
needed. At the beginning of this study, the TechOps group was presenting data centered on mean-
time-between-failure (MTBF) for the larger automated systems. While MTBF can be a useful data
point in some instances, that wasn't the case in this environment. Part of the problem with this was
that these data were very unreliable. No one was methodically collecting information as to the usage
of the systems, and not all equipment failures were recorded. NIBR uses a custom created
maintenance log, called SharePoint, which allows the screener to input a work ticket into the central
database when he or she has a problem. TechOps will respond to these issues as they show up in
SharePoint. However, any issue that can be fixed by a screener is likely to not get entered into
SharePoint, and these issues can be just as relevant, if not more so, to equipment performance. The
other major problem with MTBF is that it isn't clear how the use, of lack thereof, of the equipment
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plays a role in the number. For example, during this study, one of the HTS systems wasn't used for
over a month. During that month, there were no recorded failures, so does that mean the
equipment was running smoothly during that time? According to the previous metric system, that is
a conclusion that could be drawn. Thus, the lack of use of the system was indicating that it was
running properly when, in fact, the lack of use tends to have a detrimental effect on performance
evidenced by seals drying out or residual chemicals corroding or clogging parts of the equipment.
To address this issue, it was recommended that TechOps use the following metrics on a per
equipment basis: hours spent on scheduled maintenance, hours spent on unscheduled maintenance,
plates lost, number of service calls, cost of service calls, and cost of parts replaced. Unfortunately,
with the exception of the number of service calls, none of this information was available in any
reliable format at the beginning of this study. The purpose of these metrics is to determine the
amount of effort spent on any one piece of equipment. It does not address why a particular system
went down, but it will allow TechOps to determine where they need to focus more attention and
what their maintenance trends are. These metrics will also provide useful inputs when evaluating
maintenance contracts. Additional metrics related to the actual usage would also be beneficial, but
the collection of such metrics proved to be a lot more difficult. The next section will discuss data
collection.
3.1.2 Data Collection
Another important aspect of successfully developing appropriate metrics is knowing how to collect
them. In some work environments, a simple notebook can be used to jot down important
information about equipment breakdowns and maintenance delays. In other areas, a spreadsheet or
another tailored piece of software can be used. However, these methods require that the user be
present for these failures and their resolutions, which defeats one of the purposes for having
automation to begin with. Using the screener to record key data was attempted in this study, but
not only was it prone to user errors and incomplete information, but it was met with resistance.
This resistance came mostly in the form of indifference, which is to be expected given the culture
that such things are low on the list of priorities for the day's work. Many of the larger or more
complex equipment, including all of the automated systems, have their own errors logs that are
automatically generated whenever the system shuts down unexpectedly. These systems overcome
the issue of having a person record every problem, but they offer little description of what the
problem was. In fact, these logs sometimes can mislead the engineer as to what the problem really
is. They also generate a mountain a data that someone has to sift through and monitor to collect the
most useful information, something that hadn't been done until the time of this study.
Whether the user or engineer collected the data or whether the software was modified to yield more
informative data didn't change the fact that some level of personnel involvement with data
collection was necessary. To encourage ownership on the part of the TechOps team, a new system
was implemented to collect data based on their own efforts. Instead of trying to track the status of
the equipment at all times of the day, this system only tracks what was done to the equipment by the
engineers. The system consists of a weekly equipment log that tracks hours of unscheduled and
scheduled maintenance for each piece of equipment. The engineers enter in this information
according to what they did during the workday. This system is not a tool for keeping tabs on how
the engineers use their time, like some management systems. Rather, it is a tool for keeping tabs on
the equipment. Because the engineers do other things that aren't directly related to a piece of
equipment, it is expected that the log, known as the weekly equipment report, would not add up to a
40 hour work week. The weekly equipment report also keeps record of the other metrics previously
mentioned: the number of vendor service calls, the dollar amount spent (on the service calls, parts,
and spares), and the number of plates lost. The report also has a scheduling feature that allows the
user to set up his scheduled maintenance for the year. An example of one of the weekly equipment
reports is found in Appendix B. This system is easy to use, only requiring a few minutes of input
per day by the engineer. It also provides value to the engineer in that they can keep a running total
on the amount of time and money spent on each machine, so that they can know where their efforts
should be placed. Chapter 4 discusses the results of implementing this tool.
3.2 The Spirit of Lean
As previously mentioned, the TechOps group found themselves in a firefighting atmosphere at the
beginning of this study. In many ways, the engineers worked for the screeners, responding to their
maintenance requests. As can be imagined, a screener can feel that his or her problem is a top
priority for the engineer. Not only does the engineer feel some pressure from the screener, but
management also wants the group to handle problems as quickly as possible. This is understandable
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in the sense that valuable materials can be lost if the system is down too long and also the overall
perception that the company's bottom line is more directly tied to the success of the screen than the
efficiency of the engineer. However, this has the effect of preventing engineers from taking the time
to get to the root cause of downtime. This not only wastes money in terms of maintenance, but it
denies the engineer the opportunity to really learn how the equipment operates to the point that he
develops a sense of ownership for it.
3.2.1 The NASCAR Analogy
To try and remedy the situation, lean principles were presented to the TechOps group to try and
foster a culture of continuous improvement. One of the methods used to demonstrate lean in
action was to present to the group the example of the NASCAR pit crew. It was felt by the author
that this example would relate well to the demographic of the TechOps team as well as be applicable
in the sense that the pit crew is very much like a maintenance team. These pit crews have taken a
standard pit stop, which includes changing four tires, adding 22 gallons of fuel, wiping down
windshields and radiators, and making chassis adjustments from a time of about 4 minutes in the
1960's to about 12 seconds today. They've done that by appreciating that any improvement,
however small, is moving them in the right direction. It is continuous improvement. However,
using this example overlooks the importance of incentive. In the NASCAR example, every second
lost in the pits means a quarter mile of position lost on the track. A quarter mile on the track can
mean the difference between first place and tenth place. That difference can mean more than
$100K in prize money, some of which is shared by the pit crew. Thus, they are very much invested
in getting better. However, in the case of pharmaceuticals, what is the value of five minutes in a 12-
year process? What is the value of an hour? As a maintenance engineer for pharma, lean is a much
tougher buy.
3.2.2 Tailoring Lean Principles
A slightly different approach was taken that proved much more successful. In general, lean is
something best applied enterprise wide and uses many standard tools such as value stream mapping,
Kaizen events, and andon cords. (6) In this study, trying to apply lean enterprise-wide was not only
beyond the scope, but lean was perhaps an even tougher sell with the scientific research community.
More important than applying specific tools to a situation is to change the culture within that
situation. This is easier said than done, but it is a necessary step if lean tools are going to stick. In
order to encourage continuous improvement and develop the "spirit" of lean, TechOps was tasked
with going after those issues that were most vexing to their group. For management to identify the
problems that TechOps should solve isn't nearly as effective as TechOps choosing their own
projects. This provides the group with motivation to do more than get equipment back up and
running; it motivates them to improve the work environment, their work environment. While the
benefits may not be easily quantifiable or felt by many outside of TechOps, they bring about an
excitement to improve that is a necessary precursor to lean.
A major theme of applying lean principles is getting to the root cause of the problem. Getting to
the root cause is not an easy process, and it takes time and patience. It has been said that causes of
problems can be divided into three categories: physical causes, human causes, and latent or
organizational causes. Physical causes are such things as faulty valves or leaking fixtures. Human
causes may include things such as improperly installing a valve or failing to replace a fixture as
appropriate. The organization causes may be that there is no system in place to train the employees
on how to install valves or when to inspect the fixtures. It is this last type of cause that TechOps is
trying to focus on, as solutions to organizational causes tend to be the most sustainable. (7) The
data collection effort is an example of addressing organizational causes. Parts do fail, and the users
do make mistakes, but it is likely that putting a system in place that will allow TechOps to see the
trends in equipment downtime will be more helpful in properly addressing those failures than trying
to address each one as they happen. However, as is stated in Chapter 4, in order to see the results of
these efforts they have to be in effect for a longer period of time than was available in this study.
3.3 Maintenance Contract Analysis
The question of when to purchase service contracts can be a challenging one, even more challenging
when there is already a maintenance team on site. Ideally, the TechOps team would be able to
handle any repair on equipment under their jurisdiction, and there would be no need for these
service contracts. That may never be the case, but reducing the dependency on these contracts
should be a goal for the group. It certainly doesn't mean that all service contracts are a poor
investment, even with an in-house maintenance team. They do provide a means of insurance on
bigger problems, and they can also provide cost-effective expertise to the TechOps team that will
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enhance their capabilities. An objective analysis is needed to better determine the value of these
contracts.
3.3.1 Common Contract Terms
The contract themselves vary as to what kind of coverage they provide, but most have some similar
clauses. Most contracts include one to three preventative maintenance visits, where the vendor
comes in on a set schedule to perform a list of tasks such as lubrication, alignment, inspection,
quality checks, etc. Some contracts will split out the cost for software-only support, which can be a
valuable option. A few of the companies that provide these contracts have their own engineers who
work within a reasonable distance to NIBR. Many contracts make a provision for how quickly these
vendor engineers will respond to a service call, but faster response times mean more expensive
contracts. Even so, the fastest response times still only guarantee a less-than-24-hour wait.
Likewise, most contracts provide for responding during regular working hours, with overnight
service also being more expensive. In some cases, NIBR has to wait for multiple days and a vendor
engineer has to fly in from overseas. To keep their costs down, most vendors will try and handle as
many issues over the phone as they can, giving instructions to the TechOps engineer. If the
problem looks like it is software-related, the vendor may have the power to remotely access the
piece of equipment and troubleshoot from afar.
3.3.2 Estimating Contract Value
Trying to quantify the value of these contracts can be a risky proposition, because it depends on
unknowns and probabilities. Standard wisdom would indicate that a simple comparison of what the
contract costs versus the expected cost of maintaining the equipment without the contract should
provide a good measure of the value of that contract. There are a few problems with this logic. The
first, and perhaps most obvious problem, is that one can never know with certainty what will be
spent on a given piece of equipment in the upcoming year. These contracts tend to be priced at a
yearly rate of about 5 -2 0% of what it would cost to purchase the system anew. A catastrophic
failure is always possible, regardless of what its probability is. Another problem with this method is
that it ignores the value of the service beyond the simple ticket price. Because of their familiarity
with the equipment, vendor engineers have a higher probability of being able to correctly diagnose
and repair the equipment. Some equipment requires special tools or parts, not all of which TechOps
carries in-stock. Because the vendor is focused on one piece of equipment only, they are more likely
to have the parts they need. Thus, service contracts may also provide a measure of quality and time-
savings not explicitly represented in a contract price. Lastly, these contracts provide other
intangibles such as peace-of-mind that is difficult to translate into a contract line item.
3.3.2. 1 Parts and Labor vs. Contract Cost
It should be mentioned here that if TechOps cannot fix a problem and they have no service contract
with the vendor, that does not mean they have no way of using the vendor's services. NIBR always
has the option of paying the vendor not under contract to fix an issue on a time-and-parts basis. Of
course, NIBR is then at the mercy of the vendor as to what the fix will cost. Also, vendors tend to
give priority to their clients that have service contracts, meaning that the response time could be
lengthened for those purchasing service on a per-case basis. So, how can a pharmaceutical evaluate
its insurance contracts? Certainly, the above consideration should be one data point. If an
organization consistently spends a lot more on contracts than they receive in actual service, it may be
a telling sign to make a change. There are other data points, however.
3.3.2.2 Indispensability
One of the most important pieces of information, and one that makes no reference to contract
service level or cost, is the indispensability of the equipment. The indispensability is a measure of
the impact of that equipment's downtime. Pieces of equipment with a high level of indispensability
include those that are on the drug's critical path, in which any downtime is directly translated into a
delay in that drug's progress. It also includes the equipment that comprises the bottleneck of the
system. If the equipment can greatly increase a screener's productivity, that could also be considered
indispensable. Things that decrease indispensability include redundant capacity and lack of use.
3.3.2.3 Adjusted Replacement Cost
Another data point that may prove useful is the measure of what the in-house team, in this study it's
TechOps, is capable of fixing or comfortable with not "insuring". Most contracts will have a
hardware price and a software price. The hardware price covers everything physical on the system
that the vendor produced. This includes high precision dispensers, sensors, and robotic arms.
However, it also includes the desktop computer, the custom table, the plastic guarding, and other
simple or non-moving parts. The point is that a lot of these parts are very unlikely to ever break,
and if they did, TechOps would have no problem fixing or replacing them. However, these parts
are still paid for under the contract. The table may have been expensive to begin with, but the
probability that it will break in such a way that the vendor needs to fix it is extremely low and not
worth insuring against. The methodology here is to go through each system on a line-by-line basis
with the maintenance team and get their opinion on what should really be covered. The
maintenance team is more familiar with the system than anyone in the company, and they can point
out what they can fix, what never breaks down, and what isn't even used anymore. Taking the
original quote for the system brand new, and paring it down by crossing off those line items that
don't need to be insured, one can then get a measure of what the contract costs versus the true
replacement cost of the system. In the U.S., service contracts average 10% of the purchase price per
year, so TechOps has a value against which to benchmark. (7)
3.3.2.4 Customization
The next data point is the equipment's level of customization. There are actually two dimensions to
the term "customization" in this study. The first involves the physical layout of the equipment itself.
Some equipment is stand-alone, very standard equipment that a vendor will sell to multiple
pharmaceutical companies. These systems are tried-and-true with fewer problems arising that are
unfamiliar to the user or maintenance engineer. Some systems are very unique to one or two
companies, however. There is still a lot that is unknown about their performance, even by the
vendor itself. To make matters worse, some of these fully automated systems involve pieces that are
produced by different manufacturers. One vendor put the system together and integrated it, but the
contract will still only cover the equipment produced by that vendor. To fully insure the system,
separate contracts will be required that cover all manufacturers. The fact that these machines that
have been built by separate companies now have to "talk" to each other and work together greatly
increases the probability of a shut-down. These unique units are going to require more support than
production models. (8) The second dimension is the level to which that equipment can customize
its work. As previously mentioned, some equipment is asked to perform a different task every time
it is used, while others perform one function and one function only. The latter will be much easier
to maintain, both because they tend to have a more tried-and-true design as the vendor produces it
in larger quantities and because engineers are more likely to be familiar with its problems.
Consequently, they are also less likely to require a contract.
3.3.2.5 System Age
The last data point used in the evaluation is the age of the system. Most contracts will cover the first
year of the equipment as a warranty. After that year, it is up to the client to purchase extended
service on a one- or multi-year contract. Hopefully, most major bugs are worked out within that
first year, but that isn't always the case. Another important consideration here is how the age
correlates in an increase in the engineers' ability to fix the system. Thus, an old system that was
purchased brand new and has a maintenance team that has been using it for its lifetime may not
require a service contract, but one bought used or with a maintenance team with high turnover
might make a contract a wise purchase.
3.3.2.6 Using the Contract Evaluation Tool
The purpose of putting these values together (maintenance costs, indispensability, adjusted
replacement cost, customization, and system age) is to have more objective criteria against which to
judge these contracts. Some of these values, such as indispensability and customization, are slightly
subjective, but they can and should be benchmarked and should stabilize with time. What these
values are not, is a fool-proof formula for deciding which contracts to buy. After determining these
values for each piece of equipment under consideration, TechOps can then benchmark the contract
against one for which they feel they are getting appropriate value. This process will take time as the
group decides an appropriate scale for each characteristic, but in the long run it should provide for a
more educated decision.
To quantify the effects of the aforementioned considerations, a contract evaluation tool was created
that can use data from the metrics developed to score each contract. This tool has six separate
modules (parts and labor costs, indispensability, system age, level of customization, adjusted
replacement costs, and the weighted average). Each module provides an index for the equipment
under consideration. The higher the value of the index, the more value the contract provides to
NIBR. The parts and labor module for a fictitious system is shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Parts/labor module of contract evaluator
Parts/labor vs. contract cost
total value, covered parts replaced last year $ 12,000.00
service calls last year I
contract cost $ 65,000.00
number of PM's in contract 1
contract value $ 19,500.00
Index value 0.300
This module provides the typical analysis of a maintenance contract. The cost of the contract is
compared with the total value received in services over the previous year if the company had the
contract that year, or if they didn't have the contract, the amount that could have been saved. In
this example, NIBR or the vendor replaced $12,000 worth of parts that were or would have been
covered under contract. The number of service calls provides a measure of the labor being
provided. For this tool, it amounts to $5,000 per service call. The number of preventative
maintenance (PM's) visits is usually stipulated in the contract. For this analysis, we have assumed
$2,500 per PM. The index value is the ratio of value received over the previous year to the cost of
the contract.
The second module is indispensability, shown in Table 2. The metrics in this module were chosen
to make this index less subjective. Each piece of equipment in the lab represents a certain portion
of the total capacity in the lab for the function that it performs. This is shown in the first line.
Capacity utilization will give a measure of how much the equipment is used, with the idea being that
the equipment rarely used is less indispensable. The "ratio of project delay to equipment downtime"
is a measure of the impact of downtime on the project's schedule. In this example, for every hour
the equipment is down, the project is delayed 0.05 hours. In other words, it has little impact on the
schedule. The "percentage of screener time savings over the next best alternative" measures how
much of the screener's time is saved using this piece of equipment over their next best alternative,
be it performing the operation by hand or using a different piece of equipment. In this case, the
screener could save 60% of their time using this machine over their next best choice.
Table 2. Indispensability module of contract evaluator
Indispensability
capacity utilization 15%
ratio of project delay to equipment downtime 0.05
percentage, screener time savings over next best alternative 0.6
Index value 0.232
Table 3 shows the module for system age. This module is intended to capture the effects of age and
experience with the equipment on the equipment's downtime. The age of the system at its current
location is the length of time NIBR has actually owned the equipment. This is used to differentiate
equipment that has been purchased used. The "years of engineer experience" entry captures how
many years the most experienced engineer has with that particular piece of equipment, not one just
like it. This will give a measure of the capability of the group to handle downtime issues for that
machine, and will also reflect some of the effects of engineer turnover on maintenance performance.
This module uses an average of the ratios of these values to create the index. The ratio of absolute
age vs. expected equipment lifetime trends so that older equipment, which are generally more likely
to have problems due to wear, are given higher values. We know from the bathtub curve that very
young equipment also tends to have more failures than usual. However, just about every piece of
equipment is covered under warranty for its first year, which is why the linear ratio was chosen.
Table 3. System age module of contract evaluator
System age
age of system at current location 5
expected equipment lifetime 10
Table 4. Level of customization module of contract evaluator
Level of customization
programmability value 0.25
scale value 0.4
Table 4 is the level of customization module. As previously mentioned, equipment that is constantly
being reprogrammed to do new things and equipment that is one-of-a-kind will likely require more
attention. This module is designed to give higher values to that equipment which is highly
customized. The values for this module are somewhat subjective. The degree of programmability is
the degree to which the equipment can be programmed to perform different function. The user
inputs a number between 1 and 5, with "1" meaning "this equipment performs one function and
one function only" and "5" meaning "this equipment can be programmed to perform a variety of
tasks". The module returns a value between 0 and 1 based on a linear scale. The "scale number of
sister units" works much the same way, with the user entering an estimate for the number of
identical units of this equipment that have been manufactured. For example, if the user feels that
there have been about 500 of these units produced, he or she would enter "100" as the scale, and
the module will return a value between 0 and 1. The index is simply an average of these values.
Table 5 is the adjusted replacement cost. As previously mentioned, this is a ratio of the cost of the
contract vs. the value of the equipment TechOps would like to insure. This accounts for the fact
that there are many things covered under contract that do not need to be with a maintenance team
in-house. The index is one minus the aforementioned ratio, to be consistent with having a value of
1 representing the highest possible contract value and a value of 0 the lowest.
Table 5. Adjusted replacement cost module of contract evaluator
Adjusted replacement cost
adjusted replacement cost $ 400,000.00
Table 6 provides a summary and a weighted average of the indices for the fictitious equipment
example. These weights can be used to account for the fact that not all of these indices are equally
important. Unfortunately, there wasn't enough data collected at the time of this study to determine
what the appropriate weights should be. Looking at the evaluator as currently constituted, it would
appear as though the adjusted replacement cost will always have a high value, and system age could
be consistently low. The user can adjust these weights with time as better data are collected. More
importantly though, each piece of equipment is treated the same, and a comparison can be made
that is based on more than cost alone.
Table 6. Index totals for contract evaluator
I Totals I
Table 7 gives the values for the actual equipment as calculated with this tool. Not all of the
equipment under contract is in this table. This table only represents what data were available, and
even in this case, the author had to make estimates for some of the values. However, the basic
trends are reasonable. In this case, Company H was chosen as the benchmark contract for the
group, as it seems to provide what the group feels is good value. As previously mentioned, this tool
will not state which contracts should be purchased and which shouldn't. No tool can say for certain
whether a contract will "pay off' for certain as there is always the risk of a major failure. But based
on these numbers, NIBR may consider not renewing the Company C, F, or G contracts.
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Table 7. Contract Evaluation Results
Totals
Overall Index Difference from Benchmark
Compan B 0.497
Company D 0.479
Company F 0.360
Company H 0.611
As TechOps collects more data, through the weekly equipment report and their interactions with the
screeners, they should be able to refine this evaluator. If they choose not to purchase those
contracts and they find they weren't necessary, they can save upwards of $50K per year. If they find
that they did need them, then they have new information with which to better the evaluator. With
time TechOps may be able to define a clear cut-off point for the indices, below which they would
not purchase a contract. This tool is certainly not at that point, but it frames the questions that
TecLOps should be asking so that they can make the most educated decisions possible about their
cont acts.
3.4 Summary
Three different efforts have been introduced to NIBR to aid them with the measurement and
improvement of performance from a maintenance standpoint. Engineer-collected data consisting of
hou s spent on maintenance (both scheduled and unscheduled) and money spent on parts and
service calls on a per-equipment basis will help not only encourage the engineers take ownership of
the e quipment, but allow them to more easily diagnose their own performance and that of the
equipment. Lean principles were introduced to the group with an emphasis on addressing
orga izational causes of waste. Improvement projects were chosen by each engineer as a way to
redu e waste and generate momentum for continuous improvement, and they also provide an
additional measure by which to gauge engineer performance over the course of a year. Finally, an
obje tive method for evaluating maintenance contracts was introduced that considered the
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equipments' maintenance costs, indispensability, replacement costs, level of customization, and age.
Chapter 4 discusses some of the findings resultant from these efforts where there were sufficient
data from which to draw conclusions. Chapter 4 also discusses the use and purchase of automation
in general and how that can affect maintenance and operational strategies.
4 Findings and Discussion
In addition to the findings resultant from the three efforts of the study, a number of conclusions
were drawn about the use and purchase of the automation itself. Because operational strategies and
maintenance strategies are often intermixed, those findings related to the equipment itself have also
been included in this study.
4.1 Description of findings
The results of the study indicate that a new data collection system is necessary and that contracts are
going to need to be benchmarked against more parameters than just cost. These changes, in
addition to changing a culture, take time. The real test of the results will be if the systems put in
place during the study are still being used and improved upon years into the future. At that point,
NIBR should have a wealth of useful data from which to plan their operational and maintenance
strategies. That being said, there are a number of conclusions that can be drawn from the data that
were available at the time of the study.
4.1.1 Downtime
The analysis of the equipment generated data shows that certain errors seem to pop up more
frequently. For example, over a two-year period, the HTS systems recorded a "named pipe
connection could not be opened" error over 200 times. However, when it came to developing a
strategy for getting to the root cause of those errors, the TechOps team indicated that the majority
of them were "start-up" errors or simple user-generated errors. What this means is that these errors
are easily identifiable and they result in practically no downtime. For example, an error might be
generated if a user didn't turn on a certain piece of equipment. The user recognizes the mistake
quickly, and the remedy is as easy as flipping a switch. Of course, this doesn't mean systems can't be
put in place to try and prevent such an error from occurring, but the seconds of downtime generated
are probably not enough to put this error high on the list of priorities. Nor does this mean the
equipment didn't have significant downtime, but it does mean that the computer generated
downtime data holds little value in its current format. The data logs are difficult to collect and sort
through, due to their size and complexity. Typical large pharmas generate over 20 terabytes of data
daily, and someone has to sort through it all. (9) The automation data also require the use of DOS
commands or other code to get them in a readable format. Even with the data in a format that is
easier to read, the error messages are often cryptic and uninformative. An example of two minutes'
worth of this data is found in Appendix C and a collection of error messages as presented by the
automation itself is found in Appendix D.
4.1.2 Data Collection Methods
From a data collection standpoint, engineer-generated data proves to be more useful. As part of
their continuing improvement effort, the team took the downtime log and adapted it into their
SharePoint system so that they had one system to use. They found that keeping a log separate from
the service requests on SharePoint was a duplication of effort. The SharePoint system still keeps a
record of all the service performed, but it now includes both unscheduled and scheduled downtime,
parts costs, and service calls for each piece of equipment. This system will give management a more
accurate picture at the end of the year as to what was spent and what was done on each piece of
equipment. It won't give any MBTF values, but it will indicate to TechOps what kinds of
performance issues the equipment had, what kind of effort TechOps has made to maintain that
equipment, and whether any adjustments need to be made.
4.1.3 Continuous Improvement Projects
The improvement projects are ongoing and their effects won't be appreciated until sometime in the
future. However, the projects themselves show that the most support for continuous improvement
is given by those that stand to benefit from the results. The engineers chose projects that would
simply their processes or cut out the waste that was most vexing to their efforts. There is certainly
residual benefit to the other organizations within NIBR, but the most important result is that the
group is looking for ways to improve upon what they do and get past the firefighting method of
operations. In addition, the most successful projects were ones where a single individual performs a
significant amount of "legwork" to get a system up and running, and then allows the group to
improve upon the system in place. This legwork amounts to creating a prototype for the group.
Having something physical in place, be it a written operating procedure, a workspace layout, a set
software code, etc., sends a message that change is being made but that there is still time to provide
input and make the system what it needs to be. For example, one improvement project was to
make-over the TechOps tool room, providing the engineers with more usable space and making it
easier to find the tools they needed. One or two individuals championed this effort, taking the
team's input and creating a new tool area that has about the same physical volume as the previous
area, but significantly more floor space. "Before" and "after" photos of the tool room are shown in
Figure 13, Figure 14, and Figure 15. The team has since added an inventory system for the parts by
using bins with barcodes, a computer terminal with internet access so that they can order parts
directly from the tool room, and additional tools such as a metal mill to increase their ability to
perform repairs. Having one or two people make a first attempt, however good or bad, at these
improvement projects builds inertia for continuous improvement because it allows the majority of
the group to perform the much easier task of improving upon a system as opposed to building it
from scratch.
Figure 13. "Before" photo of TechOps workbench
Figure 14. "Before" Photos of TechOps Tool Room
Figure 15. "After" Photos of TechOps Tool Room
4.1.4 Capacity and Utilization
Perhaps the most telling piece of information coming from equipment data comes from a usage
perspective. While the automatically generated error data doesn't give much information about root
causes of problems, they do give some insight about how much the equipment is actually in use.
These recording systems record more than errors; they record every operation that the equipment
performs. Walking through the lab, it often appears that certain systems aren't being used, but this
can be deceiving as the system may be performing an operation that requires little movement, like
incubation. However, from a period between February and November the recorders show all the
days when any information was recorded, or in other words, all the days when the equipment was
used at all. The data in Figure 16, Figure 17, and Figure 18 show that, for the HTS systems during
this period, the equipment was used during about 40% of the days of the year. Taking the Saturdays
and Sundays out of the data improves the percentage very little, since some of the days the
equipment was being used were actually on the weekend. This means that, on average, the HTS
systems are run only three days a week. This says nothing about how long the equipment was run
on those days, or even if those days were used for actual screens or "dry runs". This would imply
that the equipment is underutilized, which is not uncommon in laboratory automation, and that
perhaps some effort should be devoted to analyzing the scheduling of the equipment or capacity
utilization. (9) Active monitoring of usage data will also help determine whether purchasing
particular automation was a good investment. (10)
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Figure 16. Usage Data for HTS-1
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Histogram of HTS-2
Days used over period Feb 1st to Nov. 24th 2008
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used on 30%
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Figure 17. Usage Data for HTS-2
Histogram of HTS-3
Days used over period Feb 26th to Nov. 24th 2008
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used on 39% of
days during
this period
Figure 18. Usage Data for HTS-3
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The drug discovery effort has little predictability as there are few standardized processes and the
schedule is often undefined. These circumstances create peaks in equipment demand and can only
be coped with if a certain amount of overcapacity is available. (11) However, that overcapacity
doesn't have to be in the form of complete automation systems. Benchtop units can also provide
the flexibility needed by the lab to meet demand, and can do so in a less capitally-intensive manner.
4.1.5 The Use ofAutomation in Research and Development
As previously mentioned, lowering the costs of maintenance isn't the pharmaceutical company's
ultimate goal. The goal is to discover and develop profitable drugs that fulfill an unmet medical
need. To that end, there may be a trade-off in which it is better to spend more on maintenance if it
translates to more profits downstream. For this reason, one of the most important themes running
through this study is that management, the screeners, and the engineers have to know exactly why
the automation has been purchased. Interviews and surveys of these groups have shown that there
are a number of reasons each individual has for buying the equipment. In a manufacturing
environment, the explanation is often that the purchase will yield increased productivity, increased
quality control, or lower costs. Pharmaceutical research labs have been purchasing automation for
many of the same reasons. (12) Likewise, the screeners also feel that automation is purchased for a
variety of reasons (see Q3 of Appendix A). However, realizing these improvements often doesn't
occur due to poor implementation or unrealistic expectations. After decades of "growing pains",
manufacturing has refined the science of applying automation. One thing that has been learned is
automation is not a panacea for all inefficiency in production. With that in mind, let us examine
some of the reasons given for using automation in pharmaceutical research and the impact that can
have on the operational and maintenance strategies.
4. 1.5. 1 Increased Productivity
One of the frequent reasons expressed for the purchase of automation is an increase in productivity.
There is some ambiguity as to what "productivity" means. In terms of the equipment itself, it may
mean that it will allow more screens to be run per year. It is true that automation has the potential
to be faster than performing operations by hand. However, unless that automation replaces a
bottleneck operation or some operation along the critical path, it won't translate into more screens
per year. In fact, it may well be that a screen can be accomplished faster using benchtop equipment.
(13) If more than one screener were used for the same screen, this would most likely be the case.
(14) If the group already has more equipment capacity than they use, it is unlikely that buying more
equipment will allow more screens to be run. So if productivity is the main goal behind buying
automation, the operational strategy would be to utilize as much of the capacity as possible, to try
and run as many screens as possible. This, of course, may mean an increase in personnel to prepare
the assays, but it also may mean a change in how work is performed. For one thing, running the
equipment overnight would take on a much higher priority, and the maintenance strategy would
have to be tailored appropriately. Because the risk of downtime is the primary reason for not
running overnight, the group should be structured to minimize this risk. There are a number of
options for minimizing the risk of downtime while running overnight. These options include
allocating more resources to improving equipment performance, buying more capable equipment,
using dedicated automation personnel, and having a night staff to handle any problems.
Allocating more resources towards minimizing downtime doesn't necessarily mean spending more
money. It may mean spending more time diagnosing equipment errors and finding their root
causes. This has the trade-off that screens may be paused for an unspecified period of time while
the engineers methodically study the problem. Of course, the idea here is that, as the engineers learn
more about the equipment, steps can be taken to prevent failures from happening in the future. If
the goal is to just get the equipment back up and running as fast as possible, problems are likely to
recur.
There is always the possibility that the equipment on hand simply isn't the best suited for the job.
There are usually a few options when it comes to picking out any piece of automated equipment,
and not all are created equal. It may be that one system is more robust than another and more likely
to run with little intervention. Other systems may be capable of greater capacities or speeds that will
result in an increase in the number of screens. In this case, it is important to make sure the
equipment is reliable first and fast second. One observation from the study of NIBR is that a less
reliable system will see much of its capacity wasted. Downtime not only replaces what could be
productive time, but it also has a tendency to dissuade the screener from using that piece of
equipment. Some screeners will continue to do some operations by hand if they feel the alternative
is unreliable.
If productivity is the prime reason for buying automation, having dedicated operators makes sense.
At NIBR in Cambridge, the screeners are the scientists. While the scientists have the most intimate
knowledge of the screen being run, in HDG they only use the equipment for a few months out of
the year. The result is that the scientist will have to re-familiarize him- or herself with the
equipment. Anyone who has used a complicated piece of software knows that trying to do new
things with it after not having used it for a long time is not "like riding a bike". Having a core group
of personnel who use the equipment year round can eliminate a lot of the user errors that occur at
the beginning of a screen. One option would be to use the engineers as the equipment operators.
They would receive the assays from the scientists and perform the screen or whatever operation was
deemed necessary. This might require hiring more engineers, but it would also allow them to better
learn the finer points of the equipment they are responsible for maintaining. Another option would
be to hire a separate staff that only ran the equipment. They would become the expert operators
and would also most likely cost less on a per-hour basis than using the scientists as screeners.
The biggest concern with running automated systems unattended overnight is that they can shut
down completely and no one is there to fix them. NIBR has set up limited monitoring systems so a
screener can investigate from home whether his or her own screen is still running. However, if the
screen stops, their only recourse is to either go back in to work and try and fix it themselves (or
perhaps convince a engineer to come in) or allow the system to sit until morning, in which case
expensive materials will surely have to be thrown away as their potency has expired. Sometimes, all
that is required to "fix" the problem is simply pushing "Re-try" on the computer, but there is no
way of knowing that or doing that from home. The simple prospect of having to get out of bed to
save a screen is enough to convince many screeners to run only during the day. Having an overnight
staff could remedy this situation. A very small number of screeners and one to two engineers would
be sufficient to keep equipment running overnight. Since there are only a few systems for which
running overnight makes sense, a small crew should be able to handle most problems. This may
mean that screeners who run during the day would have to trust their screen to someone else at
night, but it could greatly reduce the time required to complete the screen.
4.1.5.2 Increased Walk-away Time
Another reason given for purchasing automation is that it makes the screener more productive. The
less time a screener has to perform manual tasks such as pipetting, filling bottles, and moving plates,
the more time he or she has to analyze data or otherwise perform the science for which he or she
was hired. This is also known as "walk-away time". Automation can increase the walk-away time
for these individuals allowing them to perform more value-added activities that a machine isn't
capable of duplicating. In this scenario, it is okay to have some idle equipment (from a capacity
standpoint), since that is preferable to having idle employees. (8) This is a perfectly legitimate
reason for buying automation, but it is important to keep a few things in mind. First of all, the
survey taken of the screeners showed that they still spend an average of 10% to 25% of their day
monitoring or otherwise being present at the equipment. More downtime will tend to make that
percentage even higher. Thus, automation time doesn't completely replace screener time. Also,
maximizing walk-away time may require a change in how the group operates. NIBR tends to give
priority to the more complicated screens when two screens are competing for a piece of equipment.
However, more complicated screens tend to have more issues that require user attention. Thus, to
maximize walk-away time, the less complicated screen should in fact get priority, moving the more
complicated screen to the benchtop equipment.
4. 1.5.3 Increased Quality
It is possible that a new technology comes out that will increase the overall capability of the group.
Perhaps this technology will translate into an increased potential to discover new drugs. More often,
though, new technologies simply provide more confidence in the data generated by adding precision
to tasks previously done by hand. If this is the reason for buying the equipment, it is important to
understand the story leading up to that need. What is the confidence level in the data right now?
What are the causes behind having bad data? What are some of the collateral effects of bringing in
a new technology? Too often, automation purchase decisions are spurred by a desire to use a new
technology as opposed to actual automation needs. (8) A study of the equipment at NIBR
indicated that some of the equipment never performed as expected at the time of purchase and
some never had concrete data to justify their purchase.
4.1.5.4 Lower Cost
Buying automation to reduce costs is a common tactic, particularly when a firm believes that
technology can replace a good portion of their workforce. In the case of NIBR, it isn't likely that
the labor force will be reduced through replacement by automation. However, there still may be a
case for automation that can lower costs. Machines that can use smaller amounts of materials, can
run on less power, or result in a higher yield can also reduce costs. In this case, the procedure
should be much the same as when purchasing equipment to increase quality: there needs to be an
accurate picture of the current situation. What are the operational costs? How much, exactly, are
the expected savings with the new equipment? Likewise, project success criteria are needed before
any investment is made. (2) At the time of this study, it didn't appear that current costs or expected
savings had been calculated for any of the recent purchases. However, interviews of those involved
in purchase decision indicated that lowering costs was considered an added benefit rather than the
primary purpose of buying equipment. Regardless, understanding the current situation is a necessary
precursor to claiming cost benefits. With those answers in place, it would then be beneficial to
examine the potential for lowering costs of the existing equipment by making organizational
changes. With those options exhausted, the group can then consider buying new equipment.
4. 1.5.5 Talent Retention
It has been said that automation is also a marketing tool and that it increases the quality of life for
the screener. Automation can attract the investor that believes that a company willing to invest in
technology is more capable of finding profitable drugs. It can also attract the talent that is in high
demand for researching these drugs. In that sense, the screener views running the automation as a
job perk. The screeners themselves have various reasons for preferring automated equipment, but
one of the most popular is that it improves their quality of life. It prevents the screener from having
to do a lot of repetitious, monotonous work. It allows them a more comfortable workday while still
being able to get their work done. There is a downside to this, however. If the equipment is
unreliable, it may have an opposite effect on personnel. The survey taken of screeners shows that,
in some cases, they feel that even the smallest amount of downtime can be a major nuisance to
them, making them less effective. Thus, simply having automation does not necessarily provide the
full benefit.
4.1.5.6 Summary
All of these reasons may be valid ones for purchasing automation. With the proper due diligence of
determining the current state, management can make a good case for making a purchase against any
of these reasons. It may be the case that there are multiple reasons to buy or use automation.
However, believing that automation is purchased for all of these reasons not only runs the risk of
not meeting expectations, it makes it very difficult to design an operating or maintenance strategy in
keeping with the goals of the purchase. A comparison of these reasons and their effect on strategy
is summarized in Table 8.
Table 8. Operating and Maintenance Strategies for Automation
* Consider adding more
screeners instead of machines
* Run small overnight shift
* Reserve Capacity
* Run small overnight
shift
* Emphasis on
preventative
maintenance
* Scientists hand over screening * Engineers operate
to engineers automation
* Give automation preference
to more standard screens
* Keep meticulous data on * Perform routine
quality preventative
* Seek to standardize operating maintenance
procedure * Quality checks
* Keep meticulous data on cost * Root cause analysis
(operating and maintenance) and preventative
* Thorough analysis/testing maintenance
before new automation * Maintenance
purchase contract analysis
* Consider balancing higher risk * Should be involved
screens (unstable and/or in automation
expensive reagents) with purchase decisions
lower risk technology (less
automated or more reliable
equipment)
* Determine degree to which * Provide necessary
talent values operating the training for new
equipment equipment
* Determine impact downtime
has on the morale of the
screener
4.2 Policy Recommendations
A major theme throughout this study is that both operational and maintenance metrics should be
put in place that are easily quantified, provide an honest measure of performance, and are accessible
to screeners and engineers alike. It is safe to say that this recommendation holds true for most
organizations. Equally applicable recommendations include limiting the purpose of automation
purchases to just one or two goals, formalizing the maintenance contract analysis, and placing an
emphasis on continuous improvement through projects of the agents' choosing. However, there are
a few specific points the author wishes to reiterate that are more germane to NIBR:
1. In the case of two screens needing HTS at the same time, unless there is a correlation that shows
that more complex screens require better data accuracy or some other benefit unique to the HTS
systems, more complex screens are better left to the benchtop equipment. Giving preference to
automation-friendly screens with a large number of samples will give the automation a better chance
of running without any failures, improving capacity utilization. (2)
2. The current method of getting the equipment back up and running as quickly as possible seems
to improve productivity, walk-away time, etc. by reducing the average time spent in repair, but it
costs more in the long run. (15) These costs include the materials that might have been saved or
refurbished through careful maintenance, the excess total time spent repairing issues that could have
been prevented, and the loss of learning opportunities that are present in the root cause analysis
process, not to mention the repeated hassle it creates for screeners. A culture that is quick to buy
additional equipment can magnify the loss of learning opportunities, as it is easier for a company in a
rich industry to buy excess capacity than learn how to get more out of existing equipment.
Considering that the data show that the HTS systems are only used on three or four days out of the
week on average, it is recommended that no new capacity be added until the metrics show that it is
necessary.
3. In the case of automation purchases for NIBR, favor equipment with increased reliability over
increased speed or capacity. Because NIBR often doesn't run automation overnight due to the risk
of automation errors, the most reliable equipment will probably become the most productive.
4. NIBR should consider having the engineers run the equipment full time. Making this change will
maximize the walk-away time of the scientists, develop a clear sense of ownership on the part of the
engineers, and will likely reduce downtime through fewer user errors and an increased familiarity
with the workings of the machines. Before this change can be made, NIBR should determine what
the fallout would be on the part of the current screeners. In a survey taken of the screeners at
NIBR, almost all of those responding felt that automated equipment made them more productive,
but only one felt that the automated equipment was reliable. This productivity, as they explained it,
was the increased time to do other things like data analysis and feeling less burned out from doing
the screens by hand. Even if the automation were completely turned over to the engineers, it may
be true that the benefits to the screeners outweigh any disappointment over the change in
procedure.
5. It is recommended that NIBR adopt the contract evaluation tool, adjusting the indices according
to the experience of the screeners and engineers, and make some conservative contract purchase
decisions according to the tool's outputs. The results from these decisions will provide valuable
input towards fine-tuning the tool for the following year.
4.3 Summary
In general, the data that were available at the beginning of the study were all automation-generated
data. This data proved to be of little value from a root cause analysis or even a performance
standpoint, as the data give no indication as to the severity or the cause of the downtime. The data
did, however, indicate that the HTS equipment is underutilized, being used an average of three days
per week. Data collection methods proved to be more sustainable when tied in to TechOps existing
database in SharePoint. TechOps is currently collecting information including hours of unscheduled
and scheduled maintenance per piece of equipment, the cost of parts and labor, and the number of
service calls. This information is easily summarized so that management can track performance.
However, by the end of this study, the data collection effort had only been in place for little over a
month, making it unreasonable to draw many conclusions from the data. By the end of the
following year, though, TechOps should have valuable information to help them improve
performance. The completed improvement projects, such as the TechOps tool room, were
generally well-accepted by the team and, if continued in the future, will help to shift the group away
from firefighting. The contract analysis tool gives an objective measure by which to judge contracts.
This tool will require some trial-and-error to determine appropriate factor weights and to
benchmark appropriately. However, the tool is easily modified and, as it is refined, will help
determine at what cost service contracts no longer make sense.
The use and purchase of automation was also discussed, with the main point being that a
pharmaceutical company should have a clear picture of exactly what they want the automation to
accomplish before purchasing. With one or two major goals in place, the company can then tailor
its operational and maintenance strategies to support those goals. This reinforces the need for
appropriate metrics, as they will help determine if the automation is accomplishing the purpose for
which it was intended. Maintenance and operational strategies were summarized according to the
goal of the automation. Because some of these strategies conflict with one another, an automation
project that seeks to realize every conceivable benefit will underperform by definition. Chapter 5
summarizes this study.
5 Summary
Within the pharmaceutical industry, automation equipment is tasked to handle precise quantities of
millions of compounds, often performing operations in a different fashion every run, and often by a
different operator. It is reasonable to expect that an operational system with so little standardization
will be prone to a high number of equipment errors. The direct costs of these errors are relatively
small given that such a small quantity of materials is at risk at any one time. However, the indirect
costs of these errors are much more difficult to quantify, and can range from screeners refusing to
run the equipment unsupervised to losing a patent due to the delay in getting the product to market.
With these errors occurring so frequently, it is easy to design a maintenance system around getting
the equipment operating again as quickly as possible. This leads to a firefighting culture that never
gets to the root cause of the automation errors. This system will ultimately be more expensive as
problems reoccur and parts are replaced that could have been salvaged.
Maintenance isn't all about minimizing cost, however. When downtime can have an effect on
revenues or talent retention, it may be judicious to spend more on maintenance. For this to be the
case, it is important to understand that exact purpose for having the automation to begin with.
Pharmaceutical companies use automation within their laboratories for a number of reasons. These
reasons may all be valid, but it is unreasonable to expect automation to solve all problems.
Automation that is purchased for one or two specific purposes will provide more reasonable
expectations. Even before that purpose can be determined, the lab needs to have metrics in place
that accurately describe equipment and procedural performance. Once these metrics are in place,
not only can the lab determine where they are deficient, but they can design an operating and
maintenance strategy around achieving that purpose. This case study supports the idea that metrics
can be used to manage spending on maintenance contracts, encourage maintenance engineer
performance, and avoid potentially unproductive automation purchases. It is recommended that
NIBR determine the purpose for its automation through more quantifiable data and seek to
maximize the performance of its current assets to that effect.
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APPENDIX-A
Complete screener survey results
I Which of these systems do you use most often?
Q2
How often do you use automated equipment?
Q3
In your opinion, what are the benefits of automation?
automated scheduling, walk away time, consistency between runs
more free time and less working intensity
if it behaves, sceening is faster and less tedious
Hands off while work is being done by machine
Reproducability, error reduction, reduced staffing burn-out
efficiency: amplification of effort. consistency and improved quality of
data.
engineering and science are difficult to mesh
It shortens the time one has to run a screen. This increases
productivity and allows more time for data analysis.
each sample is treated the same, can work outside the 8 hour workday
Though not faster than people, the SelecT performs large repetetive
tasks instead of people during working hours, and eveninqs/weekends.
increased efficiency, increased accuracy
Q4
On average, what is the effect of equipment failure on your daily activities? (only for days
I vou intended to run a Diece of eauiDment) I
Q5
What effect do concerns about machinery reliability play in your decision to run
automated enuinment nverninht?
Q6
Which of the following are true about automated equipment, in your opinion:
It's faster, allowing me to move on to a new project
sooner
It improves the quality of my work
It makes me more productive
I prefer it over more labor-intensive alternatives
Q7
When running automated equipment during the day, how much of the run do you
spend monitoring or otherwise present at the equipment? I
Q8
Answer each question according to your experience:
I follow a written
procedure when using the
equipment
Q9
In your opinion, what is the biggest problem you face when using (HTS, SelecT, SolAr, P-
5)? 1
not able to be notitied it error occurs when we are not at work. some
problems could be resolved remotely.
Reliaility
liquid handlers like flexdrops on the hts require frequent qcs, clean-up is a
bear!
reliability
Getting time on the system when no one is using it.
System design limitations leading to impact on capacity/throughput
specialised knowledge is not widely disseminated.
Often the assay itself governs whether or not the equipment needs to be
used over night (ex. cell based assays with long incubations) therefore
monitoring issues at night is difficult. My biggest problem is a push from
management to continue running even when issues are occurring. There is
also a push to run as many days a week as possible even if it means coming
in on weekends for people (whether to clean equipment or set up cells) still
persists. When speaking to the group as a whole there is a lot of lip service
that weekend work isn't necessary. But then when it comes down to planning
your screen on a more private level there is a push to run as much as
possible even when it involves weekends. Basically, its not the automation
that's the problem. Just a need to see that green light all the time.
instrument crashes overnight
If there is a problem after hours, I am reticent about calling Tech Ops for
assistance given their personal responsibilities outside of work. One then has
to do as much troubleshooting independently as possible, without causing
further damage to the system. If the problem is insoluble, then that day's
run is lost. It would be beneficial if there was after hours assistance during
overnight runs on The HTS systems.
System has a error during the run.
HTS systems - robot errors, flex drop tip clogs, vspin errors
SelecT: The UNEXPECTED component failure that can't be pin pointed by a
schematic or log file, and needs a massive tear down to access and reconcile
failed component. Will require days and many down stream projects suffer.
QIO
In your opinion, what can be done to improve the reliability of the equipment you work
on?
keep as few people using it as possible, including tech ops. a little
knowledge is enough to create big problems
regular qcs of all liquid handlers
better maintenance
Update some of the readers on the system and keeping up on some of the
QC checks.
Replace worn parts
more people could take a greater concern, overcoming the inertia when
things break down / items needed get lost/ upkeep of machine is easier as
everyone is doing it routinely .
Things have improved immensely in the last few years regarding
equipment reliability. I think people caring for, monitoring QC, and cleaning
equipment properly will further improve the situation.
BAT should not be done for every assay that passes through
I have no recommendations as to improving equipment reliability. Given
that Tech Ops does routine maintenance, there aren't many other options
to increasinq reliability of equipment.
Purchase more reliable equipments than the ones we have.
Make HTS as simple as possible (equiment combination)
Failed belts, hoses, valves, etc can usually be isolated and reconciled
reasonably quickly and I have spares. Factory PM performed yearly. If a
controller, fan, cell counter or pipette head fails- It's a one off event- but
devastating to the process. A redundant (second) sytem would be helpful,
as we are planning more capacity upgrades to the current system-
leveraging more down stream projects on a single system.
I think using standard plates for all assays if possible is helpful and would
eliminate the occasional plate mis-pick problems that seem to crop up.
Redundancy (A second system or CompacT selecT).
APPENDIX-B
Example of a weekly equipment report (partial)
Week of: 6/23/2008
Equipment Unsched Sched Plates Number Parts Doiars Scheduled Corn me
uled uled Lo st of Replace Spent Maintenance nts
Mainten Mainte Service d? (Y/N) to be
ance, nance, Calls Performed
hrs hrs
TO- 1 see vendor
BioStack manual
A
TO- 1 see vendor
BioStack manual
B
TO- 1 see vendor
BioStack manual
C
TO-
CyBiWell
1
TO-EDC 1
TO-
ELx405 D
TO- 1 y 0 this was
EnVision 1 covered
under
contract
TO-
EnVision 2
TO-
EnVision 3
TO-
EnVision 4
TO-
EnVision 6
TO- 2 vendor-
Equator 1 recommend
ed
TO-
FlexDrop
12
TO- 0.5 y 250 replaced
FlexDrop valve
13
TO-
FlexDrop
14
APPENDIX-C
Portion of automation-generated master log for a typical run. (Represents about two
minutes worth of data)
[2008/06/20 11:56:24] INFO: [] Initializing sample and container status ...
[2008/06/20 11:56:24] INFO: [] Initialized sample and container status ...
[2008/06/20 11:56:24] INFO: [] Starting run.
[2008/06/20 11:56:25] INFO: [] Starting processing of sequence file "C:\Program Files\CRS
Robotics\POLARA\Workspaces\Add CMP moat.sq000"
[2008/06/20 10:56:25] INFO: [I=1(belt)] belt Mover Administration Daemon
[2008/06/20 10:56:25] INFO: [I=1(belt)] MAD Port 27000
[2008/06/20 10:56:25] INFO: [I=1(belt)] MAD Port 27000moverd vmoverd.html revision 65
[2008/06/20 10:56:25] INFO: [I=1(belt)] MAD Port 27000moverd vmoverd.html revision 65Black Box 0, port 0
[2008/06/20 10:56:25] INFO: [I=l(belt)] Simulation mode is disabled
[2008/06/20 11:56:25] INFO: [] Sequence file started.
[2008/06/20 11:56:25] INFO: [] Program /host/_addremove.r is started with pid 29
[2008/06/20 11:56:25] INFO: [] Starting Add Remove Container Program (C:CRShost_addremove.temp.r3)
[2008/06/20 10:56:25] INFO: [I=l(belt)] MAD Server ready
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=2(FLIPFlexdropl)] FLIPFlexdropl Mover Administration Daemon
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=4(FLIPlpxl)] FLIPlpxl Mover Administration Daemon
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=3(FLIPFlexdrop2)] FLIPFlexdrop2 Mover Administration Daemon
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=4(FLIP1pxl)] MAD Port 27003
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=2(FLIPFlexdropl)] MAD Port 27002
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=3(FLIPFlexdrop2)] MAD Port 27013
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=4(FLIPlpxl)] MAD Port 27003moverd vmoverd.html revision 65
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=2(FLIPFlexdropl)] MAD Port 27002moverd vmoverd.html revision 65
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=3(FLIPFlexdrop2)] MAD Port 27013moverd vmoverd.html revision 65
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=4(FLIPlpxl)] MAD Port 27003moverd vmoverd.html revision 65Black Box 0, port
3
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=5(FLIPlpx2)] FLIPlpx2 Mover Administration Daemon
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=3(FLIPFlexdrop2)] MAD Port 27013moverd vmoverd.html revision 65Black Box
1, port 3
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=2(FLIPFlexdrop 1)] MAD Port 27002moverd vmoverd.html revision 65Black Box
0, port 2
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=8(FLIPlidder)] FLIPlidder Mover Administration Daemon
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=4(FLIPlpxl)] Simulation mode is disabled
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=3(FLIPFlexdrop2)] Simulation mode is disabled
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=5(FLIPlpx2)] MAD Port 27011
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=2(FLIPFlexdropl)] Simulation mode is disabled
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=5(FLIPlpx2)] MAD Port 2701 lmoverd vmoverd.html revision 65
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=9(VALcytomat44)] VALcytomat44 Mover Administration Daemon
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=7(FLIPstxl)] FLIPstxl Mover Administration Daemon
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=5(FLIPlpx2)] MAD Port 2701 lmoverd vmoverd.html revision 65Black Box 1, port
1
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=8(FLIPlidder)] MAD Port 27023
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=5(FLIPlpx2)] Simulation mode is disabled
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=8(FLIPlidder)] MAD Port 27023moverd vmoverd.html revision 65
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=9(VALcytomat44)] MAD Port 27031
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=7(FLIPstxl)] MAD Port 27020
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=8(FLIPlidder)] MAD Port 27023moverd vmoverd.html revision 65Black Box 2,
port 3
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=9(VALcytomat44)] MAD Port 2703 imoverd vmoverd.html revision 65
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=7(FLIPstxl)] MAD Port 27020moverd vmoverd.html revision 65
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=8(FLIPlidder)] Simulation mode is disabled
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=9(VALcytomat44)] MAD Port 2703 Imoverd vmoverd.html revision 65Black Box
3, port 1
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=7(FLIPstxl)] MAD Port 27020moverd vmoverd.html revision 65Black Box 2, port
0
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=9(VALcytomat44)] Simulation mode is disabled
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=7(FLIPstxl1)] Simulation mode is disabled
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=9(VALcytomat44)] MAD Server ready
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=1 1(FLIPshakerl)] FLIPshakerl Mover Administration Daemon
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=12(VAlevolution)] VAlevolution Mover Administration Daemon
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=6(VALelx405)] VALex405 Mover Administration Daemon
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=13(DeeracFLIP)] DeeracFLIP Mover Administration Daemon
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=10(VALenvision)] VALenvision Mover Administration Daemon
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=11(FLIPshakerl)] MAD Port 27021
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=6(VALelx405)] MAD Port 27012
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=12(VAlevolution)] MAD Port 27030
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [1=13(DeeracFLIP)] MAD Port 27010
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=1 1(FLIPshakerl)] MAD Port 27021moverd vmoverd.html revision 65
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=6(VALelx405)] MAD Port 27012moverd vmoverd.html revision 65
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=12(VAlevolution)] MAD Port 27030moverd vmoverd.html revision 65
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=13(DeeracFLIP)] MAD Port 27010moverd vmoverd.html revision 65
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [1=1 1(FLIPshakerl)] MAD Port 2702 imoverd vmoverd.html revision 65Black Box 2,
port 1
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=10(VALenvision)] MAD Port 27001
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=6(VALex405)] MAD Port 27012moverd vmoverd.html revision 65Black Box 1,
port 2
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=12(VAlevolution)] MAD Port 27030moverd vmoverd.html revision 65Black Box
3, port 0
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=13(DeeracFLIP)] MAD Port 27010moverd vmoverd.html revision 65Black Box 1,
port 0
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=10(VALenvision)] MAD Port 27001moverd vmoverd.html revision 65
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I= 11(FLIPshakerl)] Simulation mode is disabled
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=6(VALelx405)] Simulation mode is disabled
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=12(VAlevolution)] Simulation mode is disabled
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=13(DeeracFLIP)] Simulation mode is disabled
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=10(VALenvision)] MAD Port 27001moverd vmoverd.html revision 65Black Box
0, port 1
[2008/06/20 10:56:26] INFO: [I=10(VALenvision)] Simulation mode is disabled
[2008/06/20 10:56:27] INFO: [I=8(FLIPlidder)] MAD Server ready
[2008/06/20 10:56:27] INFO: [I=2(FLIPFlexdropl)] MAD Server ready
[2008/06/20 10:56:27] INFO: [I=7(FLIPstxl)] MAD Server ready
[2008/06/20 10:56:27] INFO: [I=4(FLIPlpxl)] MAD Server ready
[2008/06/20 10:56:27] INFO: [1=1 l(FLIPshakerl)] MAD Server ready
[2008/06/20 10:56:27] INFO: [I=10(VALenvision)] MAD Server ready
[2008/06/20 10:56:27] INFO: [I=12(VAlevolution)] MAD Server ready
[2008/06/20 10:56:27] INFO: [I=3(FLIPFlexdrop2)] MAD Server ready
[2008/06/20 10:56:27] INFO: [I=6(VALelx405)] MAD Server ready
[2008/06/20 10:56:27] INFO: [I=13(DeeracFLIP)] MAD Server ready
[2008/06/20 10:56:27] INFO: [I=5(FLIPlpx2)] MAD Server ready
[2008/06/20 11:56:29] INFO: [I=32(Cytomat44)] Instrument Mode from dictionary = 0
[2008/06/20 11:56:29] INFO: [I=33(sbcr)] ClassDescription="Thermo Shadow Bar Code Reader" Version=23.9.0
RL
[2008/06/20 11:56:30] INFO: [I=32(Cytomat44)] Instrument Mode from cfg file = -1
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[2008/06/20 11:56:30] INFO: [I=34(LPX)] Instrument Mode from dictionary = 0
[2008/06/20 11:56:30] INFO: [I=33(sbcr)] Instrument Mode from dictionary = 0
[2008/06/20 11:56:30] INFO: [I=35(LPX2)] Instrument Mode from dictionary = 0
[2008/06/20 11:56:30] INFO: [I=32(Cytomat44)] InstrumentMode set from dictionary
[2008/06/20 11:56:30] INFO: [I=34(LPX1)] Instrument Mode from cfg file = -1
[2008/06/20 11:56:30] INFO: [I=36(Equator)] Instrument Mode from dictionary = 0
[2008/06/20 11:56:30] INFO: [I=33(sbcr)] Instrument Mode from cfg file = -1
[2008/06/20 11:56:30] INFO: [I=35(LPX2)] Instrument Mode from cfg file = -1
[2008/06/20 11:56:30] INFO: [I=32(Cytomat44)] Instrument Mode is set to full run.
[2008/06/20 11:56:30] INFO: [I=34(LPX1)] InstrumentMode set from dictionary
[2008/06/20 11:56:30] INFO: [I=36(Equator)] Instrument Mode from cfg file = -1
[2008/06/20 11:56:30] INFO: [I=33(sbcr)] InstrumentMode set from dictionary
[2008/06/20 11:56:30] INFO: [I=35(LPX2)] InstrumentMode set from dictionary
[2008/06/20 11:56:30] INFO: [I=34(LPX1)] Instrument Mode is set to full run.
[2008/06/20 11:56:30] INFO: [I=36(Equator)] InstrumentMode set from dictionary
[2008/06/20 11:56:30] INFO: [I=33(sbcr)] Instrument Mode is set to full run.
[2008/06/20 11:56:30] INFO: [I=35(LPX2)] Instrument Mode is set to full run.
[2008/06/20 11:56:30] INFO: [I=36(Equator)] Instrument Mode is set to full run.
[2008/06/20 11:56:30] INFO: [I=0(?)] Instrument Mode from dictionary = 0
[2008/06/20 11:56:30] INFO: [I=0(?)] Instrument Mode from cfg file = -1
[2008/06/20 11:56:30] INFO: [I=0(?)] InstrumentMode set from dictionary
[2008/06/20 11:56:30] INFO: [I=0(?)] Instrument Mode is set to full run.
[2008/06/20 11:56:31] INFO: [I=30(lidder)] Initialization Successful. Instrument ID: 30.
[2008/06/20 11:56:31] INFO: [I=30(lidder)] Instrument Mode is = 0
[2008/06/20 11:56:36] INFO: [I=33(sbcr)] Instrument initialized.
[2008/06/20 11:57:13] INFO: [I=32(Cytomat44)] Instrument initialized.
[2008/06/20 11:57:34] INFO: [I=34(LPX1)] Instrument initialized.
[2008/06/20 11:57:45] INFO: [I=35(LPX2)] Instrument initialized.
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=1:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)] Adding containers: start nest: 1, start
sample: 1, container: 1, num nests:
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=2:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)] Adding containers: start nest: 2, start
sample: 2, container: 1, num nests:
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=3:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)] Adding containers: start nest: 3, start
sample: 3, container: 1, num nests:
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=4:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)] Adding containers: start nest: 4, start
sample: 4, container: 1, num nests:
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=5:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)] Adding containers: start nest: 5, start
sample: 5, container: 1, num nests:
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=6:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)] Adding containers: start nest: 6, start
sample: 6, container: 1, num nests:
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=7:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)] Adding containers: start nest: 7, start
sample: 7, container: 1, num nests:
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=8:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)] Adding containers: start nest: 8, start
sample: 8, container: 1, num nests:
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=9:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)] Adding containers: start nest: 9, start
sample: 9, container: 1, num nests:
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=10:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)] Adding containers: start nest: 10, start
sample: 10, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=I 1:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)] Adding containers: start nest: 11, start
sample: 11, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=12:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)] Adding containers: start nest: 12, start
sample: 12, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=13:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)] Adding containers: start nest: 13, start
sample: 13, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=14:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)] Adding containers: start nest: 14, start
sample: 14, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=15:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)] Adding containers: start nest: 15, start
sample: 15, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=16:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)] Adding containers: start nest: 16, start
sample: 16, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=17:C=1(A COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)] Adding containers: start nest: 17, start
sample: 17, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=18:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)] Adding containers: start nest: 18, start
sample: 18, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=19:C=(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)] Adding containers: start nest: 19, start
sample: 19, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=20:C=l(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)] Adding containers: start nest: 20, start
sample: 20, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=21:C=1(A COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)] Adding containers: start nest: 21, start
sample: 21, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=22:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)] Adding containers: start nest: 22, start
sample: 22, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=23:C=l(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)] Adding containers: start nest: 23, start
sample: 23, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=24:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)]
sample: 24, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=25:C=1 (A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)]
sample: 25, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=26:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)]
sample: 26, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=27:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)]
sample: 27, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=28:C=1(ACOMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)]
sample: 28, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=29:C=1(ACOMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)]
sample: 29, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=30:C=1(ACOMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)]
sample: 30, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=31:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)]
sample: 31, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=32:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)]
sample: 32, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=33:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)]
sample: 33, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=34:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)]
sample: 34, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=35 :C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)]
sample: 35, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=36:C=1 (A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)]
sample: 36, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=37:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)]
sample: 37, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=38:C=1(A COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)]
sample: 38, container: 1, num
Adding containers: start nest: 24, start
Adding containers: start nest: 25, start
Adding containers: start nest: 26, start
Adding containers: start nest: 27, start
Adding containers: start nest: 28, start
Adding containers: start nest: 29, start
Adding containers: start nest: 30, start
Adding containers: start nest: 31, start
Adding containers: start nest: 32, start
Adding containers: start nest: 33, start
Adding containers: start nest: 34, start
Adding containers: start nest: 35, start
Adding containers: start nest: 36, start
Adding containers: start nest: 37, start
Adding containers: start nest: 38, start
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=39:C=1(ACOMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)] Adding containers: start nest: 39, start
sample: 39, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=40:C=1(ACOMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)] Adding containers: start nest: 40, start
sample: 40, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=41:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)] Adding containers: start nest: 41, start
sample: 41, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=42:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)] Adding containers: start nest: 42, start
sample: 42, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=43:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)] Adding containers: start nest: 43, start
sample: 43, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=44:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)] Adding containers: start nest: 44, start
sample: 44, container 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=45:C=1(A COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)] Adding containers: start nest: 45, start
sample: 45, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=46:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)] Adding containers: start nest: 46, start
sample: 46, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=47:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)] Adding containers: start nest: 47, start
sample: 47, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=48:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)] Adding containers: start nest: 48, start
sample: 48, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=49:C=l(A COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)] Adding containers: start nest: 49, start
sample: 49, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=50:C=1(A COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)] Adding containers: start nest: 50, start
sample: 50, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=51:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)]
sample: 51, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=52:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)]
sample: 52, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=53:C=1 (A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)]
sample: 53, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=54:C=1(ACOMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)]
sample: 54, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=55:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)]
sample: 55, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=56:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)]
sample: 56, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=57:C=1(ACOMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)]
sample: 57, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=58:C=1(ACOMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)]
sample: 58, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=59:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)]
sample: 59, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=60:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)]
sample: 60, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=61:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)]
sample: 61, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=62:C=1(ACOMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)]
sample: 62, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=63:C=1(ACOMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)]
sample: 63, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=64:C=1(ACOMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)]
sample: 64, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=65:C=1(A COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)]
sample: 65, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [S=66:C=(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2)]
sample: 66, container: 1, num
[2008/06/20 11:57:46] INFO: [] Sequence started; T = 0.
[2008/06/20 11:57:53] INFO: [] continuing run after 0 seconds of slip.
[2008/06/20 11:57:54] INFO: [] Total slip time 0 relative time 1
79
Adding containers: start nest: 51, start
Adding containers: start nest: 52, start
Adding containers: start nest: 53, start
Adding containers: start nest: 54, start
Adding containers: start nest: 55, start
Adding containers: start nest: 56, start
Adding containers: start nest: 57, start
Adding containers: start nest: 58, start
Adding containers: start nest: 59, start
Adding containers: start nest: 60, start
Adding containers: start nest: 61, start
Adding containers: start nest: 62, start
Adding containers: start nest: 63, start
Adding containers: start nest: 64, start
Adding containers: start nest: 65, start
Adding containers: start nest: 66, start
[2008/06/20 11:57:56] INFO: [S=I:C=1 (A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2):Q=1 :M=2] STARTING PrepareNestForGet
[2008/06/20 11:57:56] INFO: [S=1:C=l(A COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2):Q=1:M=2] SCHEDULED START TIME:
0
[2008/06/20 11:57:56 - 2008/06/20 11:58:12] INFO: [S=I:C=l(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2):Q=1 :M=2] DONE
PrepareNestForGet
[2008/06/20 11:58:14] INFO: [S= 1:C= 1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2):Q=2:M=2] STARTING PGet
[2008/06/20 11:58:14] INFO: [S=I:C= (A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2):Q=2:M=2] SCHEDULED START TIME:
20
[2008/06/20 10:58:14] INFO: [I=5(FLIPlpx2)] Set grip offset to 0 (was 9999)
[2008/06/20 11:58:14 - 2008/06/20 11:58:18] INFO: [S=I :C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2):Q=2:M=2] DONE
PGet
[2008/06/20 11:58:18] INFO: [S=1:C=l (A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2):Q=3:M=2] STARTING BeltPut
[2008/06/20 11:58:18 - 2008/06/20 11:58:20] INFO: [S=I:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=35(LPX2):Q=3 :M=2] DONE
BeltPut
[2008/06/20 10:58:20] INFO: [S=1:C=1 (A_COMPOUND):I=(belt):Q=4:M=2] STARTING Convey
[2008/06/20 10:58:20 - 2008/06/20 10:58:20] INFO: [S=1:C=1 (A_COMPOUND):I=1 (belt):Q=4:M=2] DONE
Convey
[2008/06/20 11:58:20] INFO: [S=1:C=1(A COMPOUND):I=36(Equator):Q=5:M=2] STARTING BeltGet
[2008/06/20 11:58:20] INFO: [S=I:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=36(Equator):Q=5:M=2] SCHEDULED START
TIME: 27
[2008/06/20 10:58:20] INFO: [I=13(DeeracFLIP)] Set grip offset to 0 (was 9999)
[2008/06/20 11:58:20 - 2008/06/20 11:58:30] INFO: [S= :C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=36(Equator):Q=5:M=2] DONE
BeltGet
[2008/06/20 11:58:30] INFO: [S=I:C=I (A_COMPOUND):I=36(Equator):Q=6:M=2] STARTING CompletePut
[2008/06/20 11:58:30] INFO: [S=1:C=l(A_COMPOUND):I=36(Equator):Q=6:M=2] SCHEDULED START
TIME: 33
[2008/06/20 11:58:30 - 2008/06/20 11:58:30] INFO: [S=I :C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=36(Equator):Q=6:M=2] DONE
CompletePut
[2008/06/20 11:58:30] INFO: [S=1:C=1(A_COMPOUND):I=36(Equator):Q=7:M=2] STARTING RunProgram
[2008/06/20 11:58:30] INFO: [S=1:C=1(ACOMPOUND):I=36(Equator):Q=7:M=2] SCHEDULED START
TIME: 37
APPENDIX-D
Automation-generated error log for a shortened run
Start Time: 2008/04/24 17:18:19
Run Errors Start:
Date Time Sample Container Instrument Type Message
2008/04/24 18:26:37 NA NA VAL1 INTERVENE Failed to put to nest "VPREP_1:nest[l]".
(Count=l) Reported MoverD Error :axis 3, moving error, holding error, motor shutdown
2008/04/24 18:50:47 NA NA VAL1 INTERVENE Move to safe failed: unknown start point:unknown
start point
2008/04/24 18:56:28 NA NA VAL1 WARNING Recover retry failed: retry failed
2008/04/24 18:56:31 NA NA VAL1 INTERVENE Ensure that ALL movers are clear. Could not
initiate PrepareToStore, mover error: illegal command in recovery mode
2008/04/24 18:58:37 NA NA VAL1 INTERVENE Get from nest VPREP_1:nest[l] failed. (Count=l)
:missing plate
2008/04/24 19:06:32 NA NA VAL1 INTERVENE Get from nest VPREP_1:nest[l] failed. (Count=-2)
:missing plate
2008/04/24 19:07:55 NA NA VAL1 INTERVENE Get from nest VPREP_1:nest[2] failed. (Count=l)
:missing plate
2008/04/24 19:11:15 12 2 Teleshake INTERVENE
2008/04/24 19:12:15 12 2 Teleshake INTERVENE
2008/04/24 19:13:15 12 2 Teleshake INTERVENE
2008/04/24 19:14:33 NA NA Teleshake FATAL User aborted the run!
